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Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks have become wide-spread on the Internet. They
continuously target retail merchants, financial companies and government institutions, dis-
rupting the availability of their online resources and causing millions of dollars of financial
losses. Software vulnerabilities and proliferation of malware have helped create a class of
application-level DDoS attacks using networks of compromised hosts (botnets). In a botnet-
based DDoS attack, an attacker orders large numbers of bots to send seemingly regular
HTTP and HTTPS requests to a web server, so as to deplete the server’s CPU, disk, or
memory capacity.
Researchers have proposed client authentication mechanisms, such as CAPTCHA puz-
zles, to distinguish bot traffic from legitimate client activity and discard bot-originated
packets. However, CAPTCHA authentication is vulnerable to denial-of-service and artificial
intelligence attacks. This dissertation proposes that clients instead use hardware tokens to
authenticate in a federated authentication environment. The federated authentication solu-
tion must resist both man-in-the-middle and denial-of-service attacks. The proposed system
architecture uses the Kerberos protocol to satisfy both requirements. This work proposes
novel extensions to Kerberos to make it more suitable for generic web authentication.
A server could verify client credentials and blacklist repeated offenders. Traffic from
blacklisted clients, however, still traverses the server’s network stack and consumes server
resources. This work proposes Sentinel, a dedicated front-end network device that intercepts
server-bound traffic, verifies authentication credentials and filters blacklisted traffic before it
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reaches the server. Using a front-end device also allows transparently deploying hardware ac-
celeration using network co-processors. Network co-processors can discard blacklisted traffic
at the hardware level before it wastes front-end host resources.
We implement the proposed system architecture by integrating existing software appli-
cations and libraries. We validate the system implementation by evaluating its performance
under DDoS attacks consisting of floods of HTTP and HTTPS requests.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The emergence of the World Wide Web has led to the rise of different types of online business
transactions. The Web has become a media for retail merchants to conduct business in
large, geographically distributed markets of consumers. Web technologies have provided 1)
businesses with low costs of entry to vast markets of potential customers and 2) consumers
with convenient and quick access to a large number of merchants from their home computers.
Retailers store consumer goods in centralized warehouses and sell them through online stores,
thus reducing or eliminating the costs of operating physical stores and large distribution
networks to supply those stores. Consumers use the Web to research, compare prices of,
and purchase a variety of consumer products and professional services, such as electronics,
household items and online tax form assistance.
The Web has also enabled leaner, more effective business operations. It allows companies
to outsource operations, such as manufacturing and accounting, and ensure tight integration
between local and outsourced activities. New paradigms, such as cloud computing and
“software as a service” (SaaS), have enabled businesses to outsource IT infrastructure and
software applications to external providers, reducing the costs of acquiring and maintaining
hardware and software resources.
The utility of the Web, however, depends on the continuous, on-demand availability
of online resources. Online storefronts must be available and responsive at the time users
access them. According to a 2009 survey, 47% of consumers expect to wait no more than 2
seconds for a web page to load and 40% would abandon the site if the page does not load
within 3 seconds. 79% of consumers state that they would not buy online from a merchant
again after a dissatisfactory online shopping experience and 27% say that they are also less
likely to buy from the merchant’s physical retail stores [25]. Within a business organization,
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employees must be able to accesses IT resources on demand. On average, businesses lose
between $84,000 and $108,000 for every hour of IT system downtime [40].
1.1 DISTRIBUTED DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACKS
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are a widespread threat to web servers and aim
to disrupt the availability of web sites. In such an attack, an attacker orders multiple hosts
to send malicious traffic toward a server, so as to deplete network bandwidth or server CPU,
disk, or memory resources. A 2012 study among network operators reports that almost
half experienced infrastructure outages due to DDoS attacks and 67% of them experienced
attacks of more than 6 hours [27]. Web site downtime and brand reputation damage due
to DDoS attack are costly. 70% of online retailers report losses of more than $100,000 per
hour and 80% of financial services companies report losses of $10,000 per hour while under
a DDoS attack [28].
DDoS attacks increasingly use botnets to generate floods of seemingly normal requests
that mimic flash crowds, i.e natural peaks in client traffic. Botnets are networks of com-
promised hosts, bots, controlled by a botmaster [116]. The hosts are usually infected by
malware that spreads like a virus (e.g., as e-mail attachments, downloadable files, or smart-
phone apps [100]) or a worm (e.g., by exploiting server applications with known vulnera-
bilities). Once the malware infects a host, it downloads the bot executable from a known
URL. Contemporary botnets also recruit new bots through drive-by downloads [113] from
compromised well-known web sites. A botmaster gains access to a well-known web server
and injects into its documents code snippets, such as zero-pixel HTML IFRAMEs [112].
The IFRAME points to a botmaster-controlled web server with malicious code, which ex-
ploits known browser vulnerabilities and infects the client host. The Storm botnet in 2007
reportedly injected malicious IFRAMEs into a U.S. Republican Party web site [89]. Other
infected well-known web sites include media web site USAToday.com and online retailers
Walmart.com and Target.com [101].
Researchers have estimated that botnets control hundreds of thousands or even millions
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of hosts, e.g. Storm [129] with 400,000 hosts, Coreflood [66] with 2,000,000 hosts, Citadel [71]
with 5,000,000 and Conficker [98] with 10,000,000 hosts. Bots receive commands from the
botmaster through some command and control (C&C) infrastructure. Most bots use Internet
Relay Chat (IRC) or HTTP servers for C&C, but peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, instant
messaging, and Twitter are also used. Botmasters often use layers of indirection to obfuscate
the identities of C&C servers [23] and the size of botnets [115].
Botnets are operated for profit and are available for hire [79]. Attackers use botnet-based
DDoS attacks for online criminal activities, such as extorting commercial web sites [99] and
disturbing the business of online competitors [65, 24]. Political opponents also employ DDoS
attacks in cyber warfare. Opt-in botnets are established when users intentionally install
software to partake in cyber attacks as a form of civil disobedience [121, 110, 111]. In 2006,
anti-Russian actions by the Estonian government triggered DDoS attacks against Estonian
government, financial and media web sites [60]. In recent years, some DDoS attacks had
ideological motives. In 2012 and 2013, BroBot botnet was used to launch more than 200
separate DDoS attacks against U.S. banking institutions to protest a YouTube movie trailer
deemed offensive to Muslims and demand its removal [92].
USER
USER
USER
BOTS
BOTS
BOTS
BOT TRAFFIC
BOT TRAFFIC
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Figure 1: Botnet-based DDoS attacks
Botnets can target and disrupt the availability of web sites by generating application-level
DDoS attacks consisting of floods of HTTP and HTTPS (HTTP over TLS) requests. During
such an attack, bot-originated traffic crowds out legitimate client requests because botnets
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can generate requests at rates several magnitudes higher than legitimate clients (Fig. 1).
Client and bot requests traverse the Internet and are received by the web server. If the web
server’s queues and buffers can hold more packets, it enqueues packets for processing. If
not, it drops packets until resources become available. Processing a packet may require CPU
resources, memory, and disk accesses. A flood of requests depletes the server’s queueing
capacity, causing both bot and client requests to experience long queuing delays and high
packet drop rates. Bots typically flood servers without waiting for responses. Legitimate
users, however, experience high and variable response times, causing them to give up or
access a different web site.
TLS-enabled web servers are even more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks than
HTTP-only servers. Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic protocol widely
used to provide session-layer security over the Internet. Botnets can target the CPU ca-
pacity of TLS servers with only a modest number of simultaneous connections because TLS
is asymmetric and can consume up to 15 times more resources on the server than on the
client [30]. Servicing connections at high rates depletes the CPU capacity of a TLS server
because an attacker can require the server to execute a CPU-intensive private key operation
during each TLS handshake. TLS reduces the throughput of a web server by a factor of
3.4 to 9 times [59], making TLS servers especially vulnerable to distributed denial-of-service
attacks. Major certificate authorities and Internet companies will transition to SSL server
certificate with 2048-bit keys by the end of 2013 [32, 34, 128]. This will make TLS servers
more vulnerable to DDoS attacks because 2048-bit RSA private key operations typically
require 4-7 times more CPU cycles than their 1024-bit counterparts [36].
Existing work has not provided effective solutions for mitigating or preventing large
application-level DDoS attacks. Research work and commercial solutions provide network-
based defenses against attacks that aim to deplete resources at the network and transport
level [1, 45]. However, network-based defenses are unable to detect application-level at-
tacks that mimic legitimate client activity. Researchers have also proposed CAPTCHA puz-
zles [131], but CAPTCHAs are vulnerable to algorithmic artificial intelligence attacks [20],
computationally intensive to generate and may be outsourced to online CAPTCHA-solving
services [42] or Amazon’s Mechanical Turk [51].
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TLS servers can use commercially-deployed hardware SSL accelerators that can process
up to 44,000 connections per second for 1024-bit keys and 24,000 connections per second for
2048-bit keys [36]. Botnets formed of millions of hosts have sufficient resources to generate
attacks that overload the hardware accelerators. Researchers have proposed using client
puzzles [86, 119, 61] to make TLS connections computationally expensive for clients, but
botnets can flood a TLS server with only a few connections from each bot.
1.2 THESIS STATEMENT AND CONTRIBUTIONS
This thesis contributes novel solutions to the problem of mitigating distributed denial-of-
service attacks against web servers. My goal is to provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the
following thesis statement:
I claim that federated client authentication using hardware tokens can
effectively protect HTTP and HTTPS servers against botnet-based DDoS attacks,
and that hardware-accelerated server front-ends can transparently and scalably
facilitate such authentication.
This dissertation presents the design and implementation of a system for mitigating
DDoS attacks against web servers. I evaluate the system’s security and performance to
support the claims above. Fig. 2 presents an overview of the system’s architecture. Different
aspects of the architecture outline the contributions of this dissertation, as labeled in Fig. 2
and described below:
1. Clients authenticate with hardware tokens to prove that they are human users. They
include proof of such authentication with web requests to make the requests distinguish-
able from bot traffic. Hardware token authentication proves the existence of human users
because it is infeasible for bots to possess tokens or obtain token codes at sufficiently
high rates to generate floods of requests. This dissertation shows that authentication
using hardware tokens is more secure and has better performance than CAPTCHA au-
thentication.
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Figure 2: Overview of system architecture
2. Clients obtain Kerberos federated authentication credentials as proof of hardware to-
ken authentication and use them to access web servers under DDoS attack. Federated
authentication providers are independent from, but trusted by web servers. Without
federated authentication, users must possess an carry a hardware token for each web
server they access. Federated authentication allows users to possess only one or a few
tokens, making hardware token authentication more practical for open systems, such as
the Web.
3. The client authenticates using a single authentication request and little client config-
uration. A Kerberos V5 protocol client must maintain configuration to discover the
authentication paths to all desired servers and send multiple authentication request to
each entity on the path. This has made Kerberos unsuitable for the Web, where clients
with minimal configuration access arbitrary web servers. This dissertation extends the
Kerberos architecture to make Kerberos authentication more suitable for the web. The
extension enables a client with minimal configuration to authenticate using only the web
server’s domain name and a single authentication request.
4. Users enter their authentication credentials through a user interface resilient to spoof-
ing attacks. This work integrates the Kerberos protocol with the Identity Metasystem
authentication framework [53]. The integration improves the security and usability of
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using Kerberos for user authentication on the Web.
5. A hardware-accelerated Sentinel device intercepts all server-bound HTTP traffic, admits
requests with valid federated authentication credentials and drops bot-originated traffic.
Blacklisting bots and dropping bot-originated packets on the hardware level allows Sen-
tinel to handle larger DDoS attacks. Sentinel prevents bots from spoofing IP addresses
to bypass blacklisting.
6. Sentinel also verifies user credentials in TLS connection requests. This work proposes a
TLS handshake extension that allows Sentinel to handle up to 39,000 TLS connection-
s/second without blacklisting. Sentinel prevents bots from sending HTTPS requests to
web servers by filtering out TLS requests. Existing SSL/TLS accelerators can offload the
processing of TLS handshakes at higher rates, but do not block bot-originated HTTPS
requests.
The rest of this chapter describes each contribution in further detail.
Hardware token authentication I propose the use of hardware tokens, such as RSA
SecurIDs [118] or PayPal security keys [11], to authenticate clients before accessing a web
server under a denial-of-service attack. A web server verifies hardware token authentication
credentials to distinguish client from bot requests. Tokens use secret seeds and a pseudo-
random number generation algorithm to generate token codes at fixed intervals of time,
such as 30 or 60 seconds. A user presents the current code from the token’s LCD screen
and the server verifies the code within an acceptable clock skew. Hardware token authen-
tication is resilient to DDoS attacks because it does not require the web server to perform
resource-consuming computations for unauthenticated client requests. It is also resilient to
algorithmic attacks because solving a challenge requires the possession of a hardware token.
Botmasters cannot utilize hired workers or online services to read and enter token codes
because tokens generate codes at fixed, low rates. Launching a DDoS attack of sufficiently
high rate requires the botmaster to purchase a large number of hardware tokens, which sub-
stantially increases the cost and complexity of the attack.
Federated authentication environments Commercial solutions for hardware token au-
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thentication on the Web exist and are already used by financial and medical institutions, but
these solutions are not appropriate for mitigating denial-of-service attacks against generic
web servers. A study has shown that web users have an average of 25 accounts with web
sites requires authentication[72]. It is unrealistic that a user can carry a token for each web
site under DDoS attack.
To mitigate this problem, I propose that clients use hardware tokens within a federated
authentication environment. In this scenario, a user registers with one or a few authen-
tication providers and receives hardware tokens from them. For example, Google acts as
an authentication provider for the OpenID federated authentication protocol [16] and can
require its OpenID users to authenticate with a hardware token instead of a username/pass-
word pair. When the user accesses a web server under a DDoS attack, the web site prompts
them to authenticate with an authentication provider using a hardware token. The provider
authenticates the user and issues an authentication token to access the web site. Federated
authentication reduces the number of hardware tokens per user, making them more suitable
for authentication on the Web. For example, multiple web servers may trust Google to ver-
ify the human nature of its users. Each Google user needs to possess only a singe hardware
token issued by Google instead of a single hardware token for each desired web server.
Researchers have proposed multiple schemes for federated authentication. Many of them,
however, are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks that allow an attacker can
capture valid user credentials. Resisting MITM attacks is crucial for federated authentication
schemes because capturing a single set of user credentials allows an attacker to gain access
to multiple web servers.
Public key cryptography, e.g., as used in the TLS protocol, can be used to prevent MITM
attacks by authenticating the source of each message. However, public key cryptography is
resource consuming and makes parties vulnerable to DDoS attacks. A federated authen-
tication solution must resist both MITM and DDoS attacks to be useful for DDoS attack
mitigation. This dissertation work builds upon the Kerberos authentication protocol because
it enables federated authentication, uses efficient symmetric encryption algorithms, and is
resilient to MITM attacks. Chapter 7 discusses the resilience of Kerberos authentication
providers to DDoS attacks.
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Improved Kerberos authentication for the Web X.509 certificate-based authentication,
the prevalent authentication mechanism for Web communication, relies on well-educated
users and is vulnerable to phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks. Kerberos provides mu-
tual authentication and is resilient to both attacks, but the amount of client configuration
required prevents it from becoming widely adopted on the Web. A Kerberos client must iter-
atively traverse an authentication path of multiple authentication providers before obtaining
credentials for the desired web server. The client must be pre-configured to discover the
address of every authentication provider between the client and server. Such configuration
is impractical for generic web clients.
This dissertation work contributes an improved mechanism for Kerberos authentication
on the Web. I propose that a client offloads Kerberos authentication to the client’s au-
thentication provider. The client requests a ticket from the authentication provider, which
discovers the authentication path, traverses it and returns to the client a service ticket for
the desired web server. The structure and length of the authentication path is transparent
to client, which substantially reduces client configuration.
Enhanced user interface for Kerberos authentication Authentication protocols for
the Web are vulnerable to interface spoofing attacks. The web browser queries users for
authentication credentials through dialog windows or other graphical interface elements.
Malicious web scripts and custom-crafted web pages, however, can closely imitate the user
interface expected by the user. Resilience to spoofing attacks is crucial in a federated au-
thentication environment because the attacker can access multiple service providers using a
single set of stolen credentials.
The Identity Metasystem authentication framework can enhance authentication protocols
with easy-to-understand user interface resilient to spoofing attacks. The existing framework,
however, uses computationally expensive public-key cryptographic operations, which makes
the authentication provider vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks. This dissertation work
contributes an extension to the Identity Metasystem framework to integrate it with the Ker-
beros protocol. The integrated protocol makes Kerberos credentials transparent to users and
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is resilient to both spoofing and denial-of-service attacks.
Hardware-accelerated front ends This dissertation designs and implements Sentinel,
a transparent server front end, that intercepts server-bound traffic, verifies client credentials
and drops traffic from blacklisted clients before it reaches the server. Front end devices en-
able the use of hardware acceleration without server modifications. Sentinel avoids wasting
resources on traffic from blacklisted clients by discarding bot-originated traffic on a network
acceleration card.
Sentinel can verify client credentials in server-bound HTTP requests and respond with
authentication challenges to requests without credentials. This dissertation provides mecha-
nisms for web browsers to interpret authentication challenges, encode the Kerberos creden-
tials into HTTP cookies, and transmit the cookies with subsequent HTTP requests. Sentinel
verifies the Kerberos credentials before allowing the requests to reach the server. Generating
authentication challenges makes Sentinel vulnerable to DDoS attacks during a short window
of time, but the attack is mitigated once Sentinel starts blacklisting clients. The performance
results in Chapter 6 shows that even during that short attack window, Sentinel performs
slightly better than a standard web server.
Mitigating HTTPS-based DDoS attacks Verifying credentials in HTTP cookies is not
suitable for checking credentials in HTTPS requests because cookies are always transmitted
encrypted over TLS. Checking client credentials in HTTPS requests requires the server-
side HTTPS front end to decrypt and possibly re-encrypt all server-bound HTTPS traffic.
Continuous decryption and re-encryption is expensive because TLS clients and servers may
negotiate CPU-intensive symmetric encryption algorithms, such as 3DES. HTTPS server
front end devices also must not terminate TLS connections because TLS is a stateful pro-
tocol and HTTPS proxies must maintain state for all terminated connections. Requiring
an HTTPS front end to decrypt HTTP traffic or maintain TLS connection state makes the
front end itself vulnerable to DDoS attacks.
Checking credentials in HTTS requests also does not effectively mitigate DDoS attacks.
HTTPS requests are sent only after the end of the TLS handshake, during which the server
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must perform expensive public-key cryptographic operations. A botmaster can flood a server
by establishing thousands of TLS connections without transmitting any HTTP traffic over
TLS. It is not sufficient for an HTTPS server to offload TLS handshake processing to SS-
L/TLS accelerators. Such accelerators can process high rates of TLS handshakes, but do not
filter the bot-originated HTTP requests inside the TLS tunnels and the attacker can still
flood the web server with HTTP requests.
HTTPS server front ends can prevent this attack by verifying client credentials in the
beginning of each TLS handshake. I propose that clients encode Kerberos credentials in
backwards-compatible TLS extensions [46]. They extend the functionality of TLS Client
Hello messages and are transmitted unencrypted, so an HTTPS server front end can verify
the credentials without carrying out expensive cryptographic operations. Verifying creden-
tials during the TLS handshake prevents attackers from sending HTTP requests inside TLS
tunnels because it prevents them from establishing such tunnels. It is acceptable to trans-
mit the Kerberos credentials without TLS encryption because the Kerberos protocol already
encrypts Kerberos credentials internally.
1.3 ROADMAP
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents background in-
formation on network protocols and analyzes their resilience to MITM and DDoS attacks.
Chapter 3 presents the design and implementation of Sentinel, a network device for mitigat-
ing DDoS attacks. Chapters 4 and 5 describe the design and implementation of a system
that uses hardware token authentication in a federated setting distinguishing between hu-
man clients and bots. Chapters 6 and 7 present the performance and security analysis of the
system. Chapter 8 discusses related work and alternative approaches. Chapter 9 concludes
the dissertation.
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2.0 SYSTEM MODEL AND BACKGROUND
This chapter sets the stage for the rest of this dissertation by describing the system model
and presenting background information on existing federated authentication protocols. Sec-
tion 2.1 discusses the system model for this dissertation. It describes the type of DDoS
attacks addressed in this dissertation—HTTP and TLS floods that consume web servers’
CPU resources—and the assumptions made about web clients, web servers and botnets. The
rest of the chapter presents background information about federated authentication. Many
federated authentication schemes use the HTTP and TLS protocols for message passing.
Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 describe HTTP and TLS, respectively. Section 2.4 discusses fed-
erated identities and existing federation authentication protocols: OpenID, SAML, Passport,
Identity Metasystem, and Kerberos. I discuss the resilience of each protocol to man-in-the-
middle (MITM) and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Section 2.5 concludes this chapter.
2.1 SYSTEM MODEL
The system model for this dissertation consists of legitimate clients accessing web servers
under a botnet-based DDoS attack (Fig. 3). The client hosts are general-purpose computers,
such as desktop towers or laptops, running general-purpose operating systems, such as Linux,
Windows or MacOS. Users access web sites hosted on the web servers via web browsers
installed on the clients. The browsers, such as Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, or Google
Chrome, are extensible via standard add-on or extension modules.
The web servers are in the backend of a web server farm with network infrastructure,
e.g., routers, firewalls, and load balancers, deployed in front of them. This system model
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Figure 3: System Model
assumes 1Gbps full-duplex network links inside the server farm network. The web server
hosts are generic server-class computers running server-class operating systems and generic
web server applications, e.g., Apache or nginx, configured to service both HTTP and TLS
requests.
The botnet generating the DDoS attack is a collection of compromised general-purpose
computers (bots) that receive commands from a botmaster to generate floods of HTTP
or TLS requests against the web server. This system model considers HTTP and TLS
floods that deplete the web servers’ CPU capacity before depleting the server farm’s network
bandwidth. This dissertation does not address DDoS attacks that target the web server
farm’s network bandwidth. The performance results in Section 6.6 show that a single bot
HTTP connection consumes 9166 bits of network bandwidth on the average. If a 1Gbps
full-duplex network link in the server farm has 2Gbps bi-directional capacity (1Gbps in
each direction), the botnet needs to generate at most 218,198 HTTP connections/second to
congest the link. If each bot generates one request per second, this requires a botnet of at
most 218,198 bots. This dissertation’s system model does not consider botnets larger than
220,000 bots because it does not consider DDoS attacks that congest the web server farm’s
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network links.
2.2 HYPERTEXT TRANSFER PROTOCOL
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is the de facto standard for client-server commu-
nication on the Web. It allows a client to retrieve resources (e.g. HTML documents and
images) over a TCP connection. In HTTP 1.0 [44], every HTTP request uses a separate
TCP socket connection. HTTP 1.1 [70] uses persistent TCP connections to carry multiple
requests. It also allows pipelining, i.e clients can transmit back-to-back HTTP requests with-
out waiting for a server response. HTTP is a stateless protocol, but servers may establish
stateful sessions using HTTP cookies. A cookie is a server-issued token that the client sends
with all HTTP requests to the server. The server uses the token to identify which session a
request belongs to.
HTTP is vulnerable to both MITM and DDoS attacks. An HTTP message recipient
cannot authenticate the sender, which allows a man-in-the-middle to intercept, and inject
HTTP messages. Processing HTTP requests may also require the server to fetch files from
memory, disk storage or backend servers, as well as to generate dynamic content. Therefore,
DDoS attack using floods of HTTP requests can deplete the server’s CPU, memory or disk
access capacity.
2.3 TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [62] and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) [73], provide a secure communication layer for application-level protocols such as
HTTP. These protocols prevent eavesdropping, tampering and forgery of data packets and
provide mutual authentication where the client verifies the identify of the server and the
server optionally verifies the identity of the client.
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TLS uses a handshake protocol to establish new sessions. The components of a handshake
include:
 Security parameter negotiation: the client and server negotiate security parameters such
as TLS protocol version, cipher suite and an optional compression method. The ci-
pher suite specifies algorithms for mutual authentication, key exchange, encryption and
message authentication.
 Mutual authentication: TLS uses public/private key pairs and X.509 [81] certificates for
server and (optionally) client authentication.
 Master secret computation: the TLS endpoints use a key exchange algorithm, such as
RSA [19], Diffie-Hellman [63], or Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman [62] to agree on a shared
pre-master secret (PMS) for the new session. They combine the PMS with random nonces
to compute a shared master secret, from which they derive session keys for symmetric
encryption and message authentication.
There are three key exchange algorithms commonly used during the TLS handshake:
 RSA [19]: the client generates a random PMS and encrypts it with the server’s RSA
public key. The server decrypts the PMS using its private key.
 Diffie-Hellman (DH) [63]: the client and server exchange DH parameters and use them
to calculate the PMS.
 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [62]: the client and server exchange ECDH pa-
rameters and use them to calculate the PMS.
The RSA and Diffie-Hellman algorithms require the server to perform a modular ex-
ponentiation operation using a large modulus. Modular exponentiation implemented using
the repeated squaring algorithm [94] requires O(n3) bit operations, where n is the modu-
lus size. Developments in prime number factorization algorithms [39] have enabled attacks
against RSA encryption with 700-bit moduli. NIST currently recommends 2048-bit modulus
size [43]. Certificate authorities and Internet companies already started transitioning SSL
server certificates to 2048-bit keys [32, 34, 128]. TLS servers are vulnerable to DDoS attacks,
because a botnet can exploit this property and make TLS servers unresponsive using floods
of thousands of TLS connection requests.
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The TLS protocol has built-in mechanisms to protect from MITM attacks. The TLS
server certificate must be issued by a trusted CA and its common name attribute must
match the server’s domain name. These conditions prevent MITM attacks, assuming that
an attacker cannot compromise the server’s private key, gain control over the server’s web
domain, or interfere with the client’s DNS queries. Most web browsers, however, allow users
to continue a connection even in the case of a domain name mismatch. Users often do not
understand certificate-related error messages and dismiss them [38]. Some browsers, such
as Mozilla Firefox, have made it harder for users to dismiss such errors, but the problem
has persisted. A Firefox bug report in 2008 describes a user getting “invalid certificate”
error messages when connecting to secure web servers, such as PayPal.com, Facebook and
MySpace [22]. Analyzing the supposed PayPal.com TLS certificate revealed a possible MITM
attack: the certificate was self-signed, claimed to come from PayPal.com and was different
from the actual TLS certificate used by PayPal.com at that time. However, the Firefox user
dismissed all certificate error messages, possibly becoming a victim of a MITM attack.
2.4 FEDERATED AUTHENTICATION
Federated identities aim to solve the problem of users who need separate identities to access
resources belonging to different administrative domains. Without federated identities, each
administrative domain is responsible to establish users’ identities before allowing them to
access resources within the domain. Federated identities allow an identity provider A to
establish the user’s identity and make assertions about that identity to relying parties B and
C (Fig. 4). An assertion makes a statement about a single aspect of the user’s identity, e.g.,
“the user’s driver’s license number is 123-45-6789” or “the user’s date of birth is Jan 1, 1970”.
Relying party B may ask a user Alice for her driver’s license number. Alice authenticates
with her identity provider A, requests an authentication token containing an assertion about
her driver’s license number, and sends the token to B. B need not authenticate Alice’s
identity if it trusts A and is satisfied with the assertion provided. A different relying party
C may request Alice to provide her date of birth. Alice’s identity provider issues a new
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Figure 4: Federated identities and authentication
authentication token, which Alice sends to C. The identity provider may provide single sign-
on, in which case it recognizes that Alice authenticated recently and does not require her to
re-authenticate.
The rest of this section discusses multiple federated authentication protocols and their re-
silience to DDoS, MITM, and phishing attacks. Resilience to DDoS attacks is critical because
requiring users to authenticate with a federated authentication provider before accessing a
web server under a DDoS attack makes the authentication provider itself a potential target
of the DDoS attack. Resilience to MITM and phishing attacks is important because a DDoS
attacker can bypass the authentication requirement if they can steal federated authentica-
tion tokens at sufficiently high rates. This section describes the OpenID [16], Passport [122]
and SAML [55] federated authentication schemes, which use redirect mechanisms vulnera-
ble to MITM and phishing attacks. The Identity Metasystem framework [54] complements
these protocols and makes them resistant to MITM and phishing attacks, but its usage of
public key cryptography makes it vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks. The section con-
cludes with the description of the Kerberos [109] protocol and its strengths against MITM,
phishing, and DDoS attacks.
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2.4.1 OPENID
OpenID [16] is an identity management scheme that provides federated authentication and
single sign-on. An OpenID user sends to a relying party a URL that identifies the user’s
identity provider (Fig. 5). The relying party extracts the provider’s address from the URL
and optionally negotiates a secret HMAC key using Diffie-Hellman key agreement. The
relying party redirects the user to the identity provider, passing along requests for the identity
assertions it requires. For example, the relying party may require the user’s age and zip code.
The user authenticates with and authorizes the identity provider to release the requested
identity information. The provider redirects the user back to the relying party, passing
along the identity assertions possibly protected with the HMAC key [21]. OpenID identity
providers allow single sign-on by keeping users logged in and issuing new identity assertions
without re-authentication.
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Figure 5: OpenID 2.0 message exchange
OpenID is vulnerable to phishing and MITM attacks [127]. A malicious relying party can
redirect the client to a fake identity provider, which mimics the real provider, and obtain the
user’s authentication credentials. OpenID is also vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.
The protocol specification does not authenticate the redirect message in step 4. A man-in-
the-middle can modify the redirect address and forward the user to a fake provider.
There are numerous OpenID extensions that integrate OpenID with the OAuth 2.0 pro-
tocol [31]. Facebook uses OAuth 2.0 in its Facebook Connect protocol [26]. The OpenID
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Connect protocol is used by PayPal [9] and combines OAuth 2.0 and OpenID 2.0 to provide
third-party applications with single sign-on and access to user information. Google [33] also
provides an integrated protocol for authentication to Google APIs. OAuth 2.0 is vulner-
able to attacks because the standard leaves many details up to the implementation [77].
Researchers have exploited the protocol’s vulnerabilities and demonstrated ways to acquire
user credentials for Google and Facebook [132]. All OpenID OAuth 2.0 extension designs as-
sume that authentication is performed inside an SSL tunnel, making the protocols vulnerable
to denial-of-service attacks.
2.4.2 PASSPORT
The Passport protocol [122] uses a centralized login server to authenticate users. A user
requests to login to a relying party, which redirects him to a Passport server. The user
authenticates and is redirected back to the relying party along with an authentication token
encrypted using a secret key shared between the relying party and the Passport server. The
relying party decrypts the token and sends an encrypted cookie to the client browser. Pass-
port provides single sign-on by allowing the client to present the cookie to the relying party
again and receive service without re-authentication.
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Figure 6: Passport message exchange
The Passport protocol is vulnerable to MITM and phishing attacks, where an attacker
acting as a MITM or a malicious relying party redirects the client to a malicious Passport
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server [95]. Using TLS prevents this attack, but makes relying parties vulnerable to DDoS
attacks. The Windows Live ID framework [17] has superseded Passport. The Windows Live
ID Web Authentication scheme reports using the same message exchange as the Passport
protocol [18].
2.4.3 SECURITY ASSERTION MARKUP LANGUAGE
The Security Assertion Markup Language [55] is an XML-based standard for exchanging
authentication and authorization information between security domains. A SAML client
requests a page from a relying party, which redirect the client to authenticate with an au-
thentication server. The authentication server generates a set of identity assertions and
issues a SAML token identifying the set. The client sends a second request to the relying
party and includes the token. The relying party requests the identity assertions associated
with the token and authorizes the user. SAML provides single sign-on by allowing a client
to request service multiple times using the same artifact.
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Groß [75] shows that the SAML protocol is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. An
attacker can modify the redirect address in step 2 to forward the client to a fake authentica-
tion server. An attacker can also exploit SAML’s encoding of the token. The authentication
server in step 5 redirects the client to the relying party URL and encodes the token in the
URL’s query string. A man-in-the-middle can intercept the assertion request in step 7, caus-
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ing the relying party to return an error message to the client. The attacker can then intercept
the next client’s HTTP request and extract the unused SAML token from the HTTP Referer
field. This attack is possible because SAML authentication server encodes the token into the
redirect URL. The HTTP 1.1 specification [70] discourages encoding sensitive information
into a URL query string.
2.4.4 IDENTITY METASYSTEM
The Identity Metasystem (IdM) [54] is a framework for identity management and federated
authentication. Each user has a number of digital identities stored as information cards
(InfoCards), e.g digital driver’s license or credit card. Each InfoCard is issued by an identity
provider and makes a number of claims about the user. For example a bank may issue a
InfoCard that contains credit card information, while the local motor vehicle administration
may issue a driver’s license InfoCard that contains claims about the user’s age and address.
The IdM framework allows a user to manage InfoCards and the release of the identity
information in them.
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Figure 8: Identity Metasystem message exchange
An IdM client initiates authentication by requesting the relying party’s security policy,
which specifies the required identity information. The client application selects the Info-
Cards that contain claims for the required information and queries the user to select one.
21
The application then queries the user to authenticate with the InfoCard’s identity provider.
The provider generates a public/private key pair, generates a token containing the required
identity information assertions, and signs the token with the new private key. The client
presents the token and the public key to the relying party, which uses the public key to
authenticate the token and verify its integrity.
The Identity Metasystem does not provide federated authentication and single sign-on,
but serves as a framework for federated authentication schemes, such as OpenID, SAML
or Windows Live ID. Each authentication scheme specifies the format and handling of the
IdM authentication token. The usage of a client application and InfoCards eliminates the
redirect messages in the OpenID, Passport, and SAML authentication protocols. This makes
OpenID and Passport resistant to man-in-the-middle and phishing attacks.
However, IdM uses public key cryptography, which may make relying parties vulnerable
to denial-of-service. A bot master can request security policies and flood the relying party
with fake tokens signed with random bit strings instead of private keys. The relying party
has to perform a public key operation before it can detect that a token is fake. The relying
party can filter repeated offenders by IP address, but a large botnet commands enough bots
to launch a DDoS attack using only a few requests per bot.
2.4.5 KERBEROS
The federated authentication protocols above are all vulnerable to either man-in-the-middle
or distributed denial-of-service attacks. The Kerberos protocol, however, is resilient to both
types of attacks. A Kerberos client sends a request to a ticket-granting server, which returns
a ticket-granting ticket encrypted with the user’s password (Fig. 9). The client uses the
ticket to request one or more service-granting tickets to access servers. The service-granting
ticket contains a new session key for communicating with a server, encrypted with a secret
key shared between the server and the ticket-granting server.
A Kerberos ticket-granting server is the principal authentication and key distribution
authority for a Kerberos realm, a set of clients and servers. Kerberos provides federated
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Figure 9: Kerberos message exchange
authentication by allowing a client to authenticate in one realm and access a server in
another. The ticket-granting servers in the two realms communicate using a shared secret
key. Kerberos v4 requires every pair of realms to have a shared key. Kerberos v5 organizes
realms in a tree structure to reduce the number of shared keys.
The Kerberos protocol is resilient to denial-of-service and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Kerberos uses symmetric key cryptography to encrypt tickets. Symmetric encryption al-
gorithms are more efficient than public key encryption and make servers more resilient to
denial-of-service attacks. Kerberos also prevents man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. A
man-in-the-middle cannot sniff or modify security-sensitive information because Kerberos
tickets are encrypted with secret keys at all times.
Kerberos uses authenticators to prevent replay attacks. When a client receives a ticket
with a new session key, it also receives the session key encrypted with the user’s password.
The client decrypts the key and uses it to encrypt an authenticator containing session in-
formation, such as client and server addresses. The server receives the Kerberos ticket and
authenticator, decrypts the ticket and uses the session key inside to verify the authenticator.
Authenticators prevent attackers from replaying stolen Kerberos tickets.
Kerberos authentication is supported by popular web browsers, e.g., Mozilla Firefox and
Internet Explorer, and web servers, e.g., Apache and Microsoft Internet Information Server.
However, Kerberos has not been widely adopted for authentication on the Web. Web servers
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assume that they belong to a Kerberos realm and secret keys are negotiated out-of-band.
However, the Web does not have a centralized key distribution authority. A Kerberos client
must also be configured to discover and traverse the authentication path to a desired server.
For example, the client must be able to locate the address of every intermediate KDC on the
authentication path. This is unsuitable for web clients, which have minimal configuration
and communicate with arbitrary web servers.
2.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter presents the system model and background information about federated au-
thentication to set the stage for the rest of this dissertation. The descriptions of the HTTP
and TLS protocols in Section 2.2 and 2.3 provide the foundation for discussing authenticated
HTTP and TLS requests in Sections 3.2, 4.3, and 5.3. The Kerberos protocol presented in
Section 2.4 is the backbone of the federated authentication architecture proposed in this
dissertation. Sections 4.2 and 5.2 present proposed Kerberos extensions and Section 5.1
discusses the integration of Kerberos with hardware token authentication. The Identity
Metasystem framework presented in Section 2.4.4 is used in Sections 4.4 and 5.5 to provide
a user interface for Kerberos authentication.
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Figure 10: Overview of Sentinel
This chapter describes the design and implementation of Sentinel [64], the front-end net-
work device I propose to offload bot-based DDoS attacks from web servers. Sentinel mitigates
DDoS attacks by identifying and dropping bot traffic. Sentinel operates as a transparent
proxy, which splices TCP connections, performs packet scrubbing, stateful packet filtering,
and deep packet inspection (Fig. 10) with the help of an established connections table. It
uses pluggable authentication modules to check client requests for authentication creden-
tials and to return authentication challenges. This chapter describes Sentinel’s design and
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implementation using CAPTCHA authentication. Sentinel issues authentication cookies to
authenticated clients and checks for an attached cookie before passing client requests through
to the web server. Sentinel tracks the number of unauthenticated client requests in a Bloom
filter and marks clients as bots once the number reaches a pre-defined threshold. Sentinel uses
a network acceleration card to mark client IP addresses as bots and discard bot-originated
traffic in hardware.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 introduces Sentinel’s modes
of operation and Section 3.2 discusses its extensible authentication framework. Section 3.3
describes the techniques that Sentinel uses to avoid committing resources to unauthenticated
clients. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 discuss client blacklisting and deep packet inspection. Sentinel’s
implementation is described in Section 3.6.
3.1 MODES OF OPERATION
Sentinel has two modes of operation, normal and suspected attack for each server behind it.
It switches between them based on server load estimates and two configuration parameters,
Lnormal and Lattack, where Lnormal < Lattack. To obtain such estimates, Sentinel periodically
sends an HTTP request and measures the response time of each server. Sentinel estimates
the load on server i as an exponentially-weighted moving average Li of i’s measured response
times. At Sentinel startup, each server is in normal mode. When Li ≥ Lattack, Sentinel puts
server i in suspected attack mode. As Sentinel mitigates the attack against the server, Li
decreases and eventually Lnormal < Li < Lattack. When Li decreases further and Li ≤ Lnormal,
Sentinel places server i again in normal mode.
3.2 EXTENSIBLE IN-NETWORK CLIENT AUTHENTICATION
In suspected attack mode, Sentinel authenticates clients to filter out requests from bots. It
gives Sentinel cookies to authenticated clients – a blob of random data and a cookie creation
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timestamp encrypted with a secret Sentinel symmetric key and stored in a Sentinel internal
cookie table. If a request arrives without such a cookie and without a response to an authen-
tication challenge, Sentinel replies with an authentication challenge. If a request arrives with
a valid response to an authentication challenge, Sentinel replies with a cryptographic HTTP
cookie that the client will include in future requests. Sentinel only forwards requests with
such a cookie to servers. On the other hand, in normal mode, Sentinel does not challenge
clients, and forwards all requests without checking for cookies.
The formats of the authentication challenge and response depend on the authentication
method used. The challenge may contain a nonce to prevent replay. To facilitate use of
future authentication methods, Sentinel separates in a specific module the functions for
generating an authentication challenge and verifying an authentication response according
to a particular method. The module also contains an initialization function that loads and
initializes an authentication table.
Note that the client’s IP address is insufficient to distinguish authenticated clients: many
clients inside home and enterprise networks reach web servers via middleboxes, such as
routers and web proxies [56], that map multiple internal, private IP addresses to a single
public IP address. Consequently, legitimate clients may share the same IP address with
bots. Cookies permit distinguishing authenticated clients from other hosts that may exist
behind the same middlebox. An attacker may also spoof a legitimate client’s IP address and
attempt to impersonate the legitimate client. Sentinel prevents spoofing attacks using SYN
cookies (Section 3.3).
A botmaster might have a human obtain a cookie from Sentinel and then distribute
copies of the cookie to a large number of bots. To thwart such collusions, Sentinel maintains
in an HTTP cookie table (HCT) the status of each cookie, including expiration time and
number of outstanding requests. Sentinel can be configured to (a) allow the use of a cookie
only in requests from a particular IP address, and (b) drop a request containing a cookie if
the request would cause the cookie’s number of outstanding requests to exceed cookie req lim.
Option (a) is undesirable if clients may use mobile IP, while option (b) requires Sentinel to
analyze not only requests from clients but also responses from servers. Sentinel uses option
(b) by default.
27
CTCP RESE
T
TCP RESE
T
ISN(C)
SYN COOK
IE(C)
ISN(C)+1, HTTP COOKIE+HTTP GET
ISN(C)+1
SENTINELCLIENT
SYN COOK
IE(A)
ISN(A)
ISN(A)+1
ISN(B)

SYN  COO
KIE(B)
ISN(B)+1
ISN(B)+1, CHALLENGE + RESPONSE
SYN COOK
IE(A)+1, H
TTP 200+C
HALLENG
E
HTTP 301+
HTTP COO
KIE
ISN(A)+1, HTTP GETA
B
Figure 11: SYN cookies and asynchronous client authentication
3.3 COMMITTING RESOURCES TO UNAUTHENTICATED CLIENTS
Sentinel combines three techniques to avoid committing to unauthenticated clients Sentinel’s
memory and any of the protected servers’ resources.
First, when Sentinel receives a client request for a new connection to a protected server,
if the client is not blacklisted, Sentinel replies on behalf of the server with a standard SYN
cookie [45]. That is, Sentinel computes a cryptographic function of the client’s and server’s
IP addresses and port numbers, the client’s proposed maximum segment size, the current
time, and a secret. Sentinel uses the result as the initial sequence number (ISN) it sends
to the client. Sentinel does not store any values related to the client’s connection request.
When the client replies, its acknowledgment number should equal Sentinel’s ISN plus one.
Sentinel verifies this property cryptographically and recovers from the client’s reply (instead
of a table) the TCP state needed for the connection with the client. Sentinel may offload
this function to the network interface card for hardware acceleration.
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Second, if Sentinel needs to authenticate clients (suspected attack mode), it does so asyn-
chronously, as illustrated in Fig. 11. When Sentinel receives a request from an unauthen-
ticated client, Sentinel uses the first connection (A) to convey Sentinel’s authentication
challenge to the client. To avoid holding TCP state, Sentinel forcibly closes this connection.
Using a new connection (B), the client presents its authentication response to Sentinel. If
the response is valid, Sentinel redirects the client to the URL the client originally requested
(HTTP 301 status code), provides the client an HTTP cookie, and again forcibly closes
the connection (the client always starts a new connection after receiving status code 301).
Finally, using another connection (C), the client resends its original request, but now with
the Sentinel cookie.
Third, when Sentinel receives a request with a valid Sentinel cookie on a connection
(C) (Fig. 11), Sentinel opens another connection (C’) with the protected server (Fig. 12).
Sentinel then splices together the client and server connections (C) and (C’). The client’s
and Sentinel’s ISNs in C are respectively ISN c and ISN sc = SYN cookie. Sentinel’s and the
server’s ISNs in C’ are respectively ISN ss = ISN c and ISN s. To splice the two connections
C and C’ together, Sentinel computes C’s sequence number shift (SNS): SNS = SYN cookie
− ISN s. Sentinel allocates for the spliced connections an entry in Sentinel’s established
connection table (ECT), and stores C’s SNS in it.
ECT is a hash table indexed by the client’s and server’s IP addresses and port numbers.
When Sentinel receives from a client a packet with acknowledgement matching an ECT
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entry, Sentinel adjusts the acknowledgement number by SNS and forwards the packet to the
server, without checking for cookies. Conversely, when Sentinel receives a packet from the
server, Sentinel adjusts the sequence number by SNS and forwards it to the client.
When the HTTP cookie used to create an ECT entry expires or Sentinel has not observed
any valid packet in the respective connections for a period longer than a threshold, Sentinel
forcibly closes the connections and destroys the ECT entry.
3.4 COUNTING UNAUTHENTICATED REQUESTS AND
BLACKLISTING
Attackers might frivolously trigger authentications to exhaust Sentinel CPU cycles or net-
work bandwidth, thus causing denial of service to legitimate users despite the defenses de-
scribed in the previous subsection. To avoid such attacks, Sentinel keeps track of how many
authentication challenges it has issued to each client IP address. When the number of consec-
utive HTTP requests without a valid Sentinel cookie exceeds the threshold, the client will be
blacklisted as a bot. Sentinel stores this information in a Challenge Count Bloom Filter
(CCBF). CCBF contains N cells, each with a b-bit counter num chali. Each IP address
corresponds to k of those cells, selected by k hash functions. Cell i is said to be saturated
if num chali = S, where S = 2
b − 1. For example, the CCBF can contain N = 1048576
cells, each with a b = 5-bit num chali counter. Each IP address may go through k = 2 dif-
ferent hash functions and map to two different cells. A cell is saturated when its num chali
counter reaches S = 31. If all two cells corresponding to an IP address have num chali = 31,
the client behind that IP address with very high probability has sent 31 consecutive HTTP
requests without a valid cookie and should be blacklisted as a bot.
In suspected attack mode, when Sentinel issues an authentication challenge to a client,
Sentinel increments the corresponding CCBF counters by min(1, S−num chali). Conversely,
when Sentinel receives a valid response to an authentication challenge, Sentinel decrements
the corresponding CCBF counters by min(η, num chali). A value η > 1 is used to avoid
long-term error accumulation.
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If all CCBF counters corresponding to an IP address are saturated, Sentinel concludes
that the IP address harbors a bot, because a human would have given up before making
so many authentication errors. Sentinel blacklists the IP address and does not consider
future packets from it. Sentinel may offload this filtering rule to a network acceleration
card. Chapter 6 presents the performance evaluation of Sentinel before blacklisting and
after blacklisting. The experimental results show that Sentinel can process up to 19,000
HTTP requests/second before blacklisting. Sentinel takes roughly 10 seconds to identify
and blacklist the bot IP addresses. The DDoS attack is then reduced to a flood of SYN
packets, which are discarded on the network acceleration card.
3.4.1 BLOOM FILTER FALSE POSITIVES
Due to the nature of Bloom filters, the mechanism for bot detection is resistant to false
negatives, i.e. Sentinel will always mark clients with S = 31 unauthenticated requests as
bots. Attackers can not spoof IP addresses to blacklisting because Sentinel verifies the SYN
cookie during the TCP handshake. When a bot sends 31 unauthenticated requests, Sentinel
saturates all k = 2 Bloom filter counters. When Sentinel looks up the bot IP address, all
2 counters are saturated because the Sentinel decrements them only when it detects the
presence of a human user at the client host. Sentinel does not increment already saturated
counters from and thus prevents Bloom filter counters from overflowing.
The Sentinel’s Bloom filter lookup function, however, is susceptible to false positives,
where hash function collisions can saturate all k = 2 counters of a legitimate client and mark
it as a bot. The probability of a lookup false positive in a binary, non-counting Bloom filter is
equal to the probability that all k bits corresponding to the queried element are set to 1 after
inserting n elements: (1−e−knN )k [49]. The probability of a lookup false positive in Sentinel’s
Bloom filter is equal to the probability of all k bits being saturated after blacklisting n IP
addresses: (1 − e−knN31 )k. For k = 2 and N = 1048576, the probability remains close to 0%
even after blacklisting millions of IP addresses.
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3.4.2 BLACKLISTING
Sentinel blacklisting is similar to standard firewall rules that filter out unauthorized and
malicious traffic. Section 8.7 discusses firewalls as an alternative to Sentinel for discarding
blacklisted traffic. Sentinel blacklisting is also similar to the Spamhaus Block List (SBL)
maintained by the Spamhaus project [13], which blacklists IP addresses determined to belong
to spam sources or spam servers. Spamhaus does not recommend SBL users to accept e-
mail traffic from blacklisted IP addresses. The responsibility of removing an IP address
from the SBL falls entirely on the owner of the blacklisted IP address. SBL blacklist entries
are removed after a pre-set timeout, which may range between one day and one year. In
comparison, Sentinel blacklists client IP addresses determined to belong to bots. The current
Sentinel design assumes that the web server farm behind Sentinel consists of servers belonging
to the same organization, e.g., a Google data storage server farm. After blacklisting an IP
address as a response to a DDoS attack against a single web server, Sentinel drops traffic
from the blacklisted client to all web servers behind Sentinel. Sentinel can be extended to
ban a client IP from accessing only a single server by using both the client IP and server
IP addresses in the Bloom filter and the filtering rule. This flexibility may be beneficial
for mitigating DDoS attacks against server farms, where each server belongs to a different
organization.
Sentinel periodically rehabilitates blacklisted IP addresses. During each time period
Ti = 10 seconds, Sentinel also measures the number of requests that hit or miss the black-
list, respectively Bh,i and Bm,i, and calculates the average server loads average(Li). Sentinel
continuously collects per-server historical data consisting of the number of blacklist misses
Bm,i and the average server load average(Li). It uses the historical data to continuously
update a regressional model that estimates the critical number of blacklist misses Bc,i cor-
responding to response time average(Li) = Lnormal. At the end of each time period Ti, if
average(Li) ≤ Lnormal and ∀i : Bm,i+Bh,i ≤ Bc,i, Sentinel clears the blacklist, rehabilitating
all IP addresses. It is the user’s or system administrator’s responsibility to disinfect the
client host and remove the bot malicious executable to prevent being blacklisted again.
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3.5 PACKET FILTERING, SCRUBBING, AND DEEP PACKET
INSPECTION
Sentinel gleans from observed packets the state of each direction of a connection, including
sequence and acknowledgment numbers and receive window size. Sentinel records this in-
formation in its ECT and uses it for stateful packet filtering [130], which defines acceptable
ranges for TCP and IP header fields throughout a TCP connection and drops packets with
header field values that are inconsistent with the current state of the respective connection.
TCP and IP allow packets, including client requests, to be split into multiple segments
and fragments. Because reassembly occurs only at the destination, attackers may intention-
ally split packets to make it difficult for network-based defenses to identify patterns. For
example, an attacker can split a field containing a value that network intrusion detection
systems (NIDSs) might use as a signature into two or more fragments. Attackers can also
intentionally make fragments overlap, such that even if a NIDS can detect patterns across
fragments, the NIDS may miss a signature because the NIDS resolves the overlap differently
from the destination. Alternatively, attackers can intentionally omit one or more fragments
of each packet so as to fill reassembly memory, causing denial of service.
To efficiently deal with such fragmentation attacks, Sentinel selectively performs packet
scrubbing [78]. Until Sentinel has all segments and fragments in a request’s application-
layer header, Sentinel timestamps and enqueues them by sequence number and offset. If
contiguous segments or fragments overlap, Sentinel trims the older one before enqueueing
the new one. Sentinel also sets a timeout when it receives the first segment or fragment of
the application-layer header. If some segment or fragment is still missing when the timeout
expires, Sentinel drops all the enqueued segments and fragments of that connection.
When a request’s entire application-layer header is available, Sentinel analyzes it in place
(deep packet inspection without copying). Sentinel uses the Knuth-Morris-Pratt (KMP) al-
gorithm [93] to search for keywords and patterns in the header. The algorithm runs in
O(http header length + pattern length) time, enabling high throughput. Analysis also deter-
mines the sequence number of the next application-layer header.
After analysis of an application-layer header, Sentinel forwards any segments or fragments
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with ending sequence number lower than the beginning of the next application-layer header
(i.e., Sentinel does not scrub the application-layer payload). If analysis does not reveal the
sequence number of the next application-layer header then, after analysis of the current
header, Sentinel can be configured to forward packets without scrubbing or further analysis
until the connection is closed. The latter case corresponds to legacy HTTP 1.0 without
persistent connections or pipelining [70], i.e., with only one request per connection.
3.6 IMPLEMENTATION
Sentinel could be implemented in the kernel network stack above the network device driver
layer [64]. However, it would still use CPU cycles and buffer space to process and drop black-
listed bot traffic. In this dissertation, Sentinel is implemented using hardware acceleration.
Packets from blacklisted clients are discarded by a network acceleration card without using
significant host CPU resources. Thus, Sentinel can withstand attacks of much larger scale.
3.6.1 NETRONOME NFE-I8000
The Netronome Flow Engine (NFE) I8000 platform is a network acceleration card that
contains an Intel IXP2855 network processor unit (NPU) and on-card memory (Fig. 13).
The NPU comprises an XScale microprocessor and sixteen programmable microengines for
on-card packet classification. The NFE platform provides up to 768 MB of RDRAM, 40 MB
of QDR SRAM and Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAM) space. The card has
four SFP network ports and is connected to the host through a PCI Express bus with four
active lanes providing 2GB/s aggregate capacity.
The NPU processes Ethernet frames arriving at the NFE ports by matching them consec-
utively against the NFE’s flow and rules tables. The flow table contains actions for existing
connections. If a packet does not belong to an existing flow, it is matched against the rules
table, which specifies actions for packets from future flows. If the NPU finds a match, it
copies the rule back to the flow table (to process further packets from the same flow) and
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Figure 13: Structure of the NFE Platform
executes the specified action. The NPU can execute one of the following actions on a frame:
drop, reject (drop and send TCP reset message), pass (forward to all NFE ports) or forward
up to the host for further analysis.
The rules table stored in the TCAM memory of Sentinel’s NFE I8000 acceleration card
has space for up to 32,768 filtering rules. The key for rules table lookup operations can
contain the source IP address, destination IP address and other packet header fields. The
rule key can match network flows against an IP address subnet instead of a specific IP
address, which allows a single rule to match network flows against multiple IP addresses.
Netronome’s new-generation NFE-3240 network acceleration card has an expanded TCAM
memory and can contain up to 262,144 rules.
3.6.1.1 SOFTWARE APIs The NFE platform comes with two software packages. The
Network Flow Driver (NFD) is a set of Linux kernel modules and userspace libraries
providing an API for low-level communication with the NFE over the PCI Express bus (see
Fig. 13). The Network Flow Manager (NFM) uses NFD to provide high-level APIs for
application-level packet classification:
 the zero-copy packet access API allows NFM applications to access packets that the
NFE NPU forwards to the host. The API provides high performance by using zero-copy
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DMA mapping to make frame buffers available to userspace applications.
 the flow and rules APIs allow NFM applications to make decisions about packet
classification on the application level and pass them to the NFE platform to enforce.
The flow API provides interaction with the NFE flow table (existing flows) and the rules
API is used to populate the NFE rules table (future flows). The NFM rules have two
components. The rule key contains slots for packet header fields, such as IP addresses
and TCP port numbers. If a field is set into the rule key with a desired value, e.g,
TCP port = 80, the field is checked when matching the rule against incoming packets
on the NFE card. If no value for that field is specified in the rule key, a wildcard value
is assumed and the field is not checked during matching. Each NFM rule also contains
an action to take if the packet matches the rule, such as to drop the packet silently,
drop the packet and respond with a TCP RST packet, pass the packet through the NFE
card without further action, or send the packet up to the user application for further
processing.
Sentinel’s NFM implementation uses the zero-copy packet access API to allocate and
deallocate packet buffers and to send and receive frames through the NFE card. In suspected
attack mode, when a client is blacklisted, Sentinel uses the NFM rule and flow APIs to
instruct the NFE NPU to drop packets from the client’s IP address in existing and future
flows. Dropping malicious packets in the NFE card significantly reduces the number of
packets reaching the host and the resources used per bot connection.
3.6.2 CAPTCHA AUTHENTICATION MODULE
Sentinel uses CAPTCHAs to distinguish bots from human clients. CAPTCHA images with
distorted text containing each approximately 2,000 bytes are stored in the authentication
table. Each table entry also contains fields with the respective solution, the time when the
puzzle was sent to a client, and whether a solution has been received. The module prepares
the challenge as two back-to-back packets. The module rejects solutions received too long
after the challenge expires, or if another solution has already solved the challenge. More
details on CAPTCHA generation are presented in Section 6.4.
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4.0 HARDWARE TOKEN AUTHENTICATION IN A FEDERATED
SETTING
The Sentinel front-end device presented in Chapter 3 used CAPTCHA authentication to
distinguish between legitimate human users and bots. However, to mitigate botnet-based
DDoS attacks, Sentinel must either dynamically generate CAPTCHA puzzles at the same
rate as the botnet’s request rate, or serve the same puzzle in response to multiple bot
requests. Dynamically generating CAPTCHA puzzles is computationally intensive and can
deplete Sentinel’s CPU resources, while reusing puzzles makes Sentinel vulnerable to attacks
using human CAPTCHA solvers.
This chapter presents a new system architecture based on Sentinel that uses hardware
token authentication in a federated setting to more efficiently tell human users and bots
apart. The architecture uses Kerberos federated authentication to reduce the number of
hardware tokens a user needs and extends Kerberos to make it more suitable for light-weight
web clients. An extended version of Sentinel leverages its deep packet inspection capabilities
to efficiently verify Kerberos authentication credentials. On the client side, Kerberos and
hardware token authentication must be unified into an intuitive, secure user interface for
entering authentication credentials. The architecture described in this chapter uses the
Identity Metasystem framework and information cards to present an integrated, intuitive
user interface with built-in security features, such as resilience to spoofing attacks.
Fig. 14 shows an overview of the system architecture. A web client sends web requests
over HTTP or TLS to a web server. An extended version of the Sentinel front-end appliance
intercepts the client requests, checks for authentication credentials, and challenges the client
to authenticate with a hardware token before accessing the web server. The web client
sends an authentication request with the user’s hardware token code to the client’s Kerberos
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KDC. The KDC passes the token code to an RSA authentication server for verification. Upon
success, the client’s KDC traverses the path of Kerberos realms to Sentinel’s KDC, obtains
Kerberos authentication credentials from Sentinel’s KDC, and returns the credentials to the
client. The client sends the credentials to the web server with subsequent HTTP and TLS
connections. Sentinel intercepts the requests, verifies the credentials and passes the requests
to the web server.
The orange box in Fig 14 represents the novel component introduced by this architecture:
the Sentinel front end device. The yellow boxes represent existing software applications
extended in this architecture: the client’s browser and the client’s KDC. The blue boxes
in Fig. 14 represent existing, unmodified software applications: the RSA Authentication
Manager, the intermediate Kerberos KDC, Sentinel’s KDC, the web servers, and the web
server farm network infrastructure. The dotted lines show the trust domains in the system.
The extensions to the software applications and network protocols proposed in this archi-
tecture are minimally intrusive. The client’s browser is naturally extensible through browser
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add-ons. The HTTP and TLS protocols used by the web client, server, and Sentinel are
also naturally extensible via opaque HTTP cookies and TLS extensions, respectively. The
extension to the client’s KDC is implemented by adding functionality to the existing KDC
application and adding a separate proxy ticket service running on the same host. The system
architecture proposed here does not require the modification of server network infrastruc-
ture, such as firewalls and routers. The addition of Sentinel is transparent to web clients,
web servers and network infrastructure.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 presents the hardware token
authentication mechanism that distinguishes between human users and bots. Section 4.2
discusses the proposed Kerberos protocol extensions. Section 4.3 introduces the Sentinel
extensions for processing and verifying Kerberos authentication credentials. Section 4.4
describes the integration with the information card client-side user interface.
4.1 HARDWARE TOKEN AUTHENTICATION
Hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurIDs, are small form factor hardware devices that use
an internal clock and a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) to generate one-time
passwords (token codes) over fixed intervals of time. The PRNG is seeded with a factory-
encoded secret key. The token uses an internal battery to power itself and displays the
one-time passwords on an LCD display. When authenticating, a user reads the current
token code and provides it to an authentication server, such as the RSA Authentication
Manager [35]. The server uses the same PRNG and seed key to determine the expected
token code at this time and verifies that that the two codes match.
Hardware token authentication is suitable for identifying traffic from automated bots
because it is infeasible for bots to obtain one-time passwords from hardware tokens. A
botmaster can stage DDoS attacks by employing people to manually enter hardware token
codes. However, RSA SecurIDs release new one-time passwords over fixed intervals of one
minute, which implies that the botmaster must obtain a large number of tokens to sustain
the high rate of token codes needed to carry out a successful DDoS attack. It is infeasible
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for an attacker to obtain a large number of tokens because each token is registered at an
authentication provider and issued only to a legitimate user. A rogue authentication provider
may collude with the botmaster and issue hardware tokens for bots. Sentinel can detect this
anomaly and revoke trust from the rogue provider. Chapter 7 discusses rogue SecurID
authentication providers in greater detail.
4.2 KERBEROS FEDERATED AUTHENTICATION
Unless used in a federated authentication environment, hardware token authentication re-
quires users to have a single hardware token per web server they wish to access. Federated
authentication enables multiple web servers to offload authentication to a third-party au-
thentication provider. When using hardware token authentication integrated into a federated
setting, users authenticate with a single hardware token to a single authentication provider
in order to access multiple web servers. In this dissertation, I propose integrating hardware
token authentication with the Kerberos V5 authentication protocol.
Kerberos V5 is a government-approved [50], efficient protocol for mutual authentication.
Every Kerberos client or server is known as a principal and belongs to an administrative
domain known as a realm. Every Kerberos realm has a key distribution center (KDC)
that lets clients authenticate to access servers. Kerberos V5 realms may be organized in
a tree hierarchy and traversing the tree edges between two realms forms an authentication
path between them. Conventionally, Kerberos realms are mapped to DNS domains [109].
Fig. 15 shows a possible authentication path between two DNS nodes – alice.cs.pitt.edu and
webserver.accounting.pnc.com.
The Kerberos V5 protocol for inter-realm authentication [109] uses iterative authentica-
tion requests (Fig. 16). A client C in realm R1 contacts its local KDC K1 to obtain a service
ticket for server S in Rn. R1 and Rn may be connected through an arbitrary number of
intermediate realms that form the authentication path between C and S. K1 extracts from
its configuration file the next-hop realm R2 on the authentication path to S and issues to
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Figure 15: Sample authentication path between Kerberos realms
C a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) for R2’s KDC K2. C iteratively sends a request to each
realm’s KDC on the authentication path until it receives a service ticket for S from the KDC
Kn in Rn. C stores received tickets in its local credential cache.
Traditional Kerberos inter-realm authentication requires C to know the locations of all
KDCs on the auhentication path and to reveal its Kerberos identity to the server. This is
unsuitable for generic web browsing, where light-weight clients often visit web sites without
authenticating with them. Sections 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 propose Kerberos extensions to
enable light-weight clients to browse web sites without revealing their Kerberos identities.
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4.2.1 INTEGRATING HARDWARE TOKEN AUTHENTICATION INTO KER-
BEROS
This dissertation extends the Kerberos V5 protocol to include hardware token authentication
as a single-use authentication mechanism (SAM) [80]. The SAM framework allows single-use
authentication mechanisms, such as RSA SecurID one-time passwords, to be used as Ker-
beros V5 pre-authentication methods. Kerberos clients and key distribution centers (KDCs)
use the pre-authentication data (PADATA) fields in authentication requests, responses and
error message to negotiate the type of authentication required.
If a Kerberos client sends an authentication request (AS-REQ) without sufficient authen-
tication credentials, the KDC responds with an error message containing a SAM challenge
(Fig. 17). The challenge contains the type of SAM required, a nonce and a checksum gener-
ated using the client’s symmetric key Kc derived from the user’s Kerberos password.
KRB−ERROR w
/ SAM PADATA
AS−REQ w/o SAM preauth
AS−REQ w/ SecurID credentials
KDCCLIENT
Figure 17: Kerberos pre-authentication with hardware tokens
The client uses Kc to verify the SAM challenge checksum, extracts the SAM authenti-
cation type and queries the user for his/her RSA SecurID PIN and token code. The client
then encrypts the credentials and KDC’s nonce with Kc and includes the encrypted data in
a SAM response within a new AS-REQ message. The KDC decrypts the encrypted data
with the client’s key, verifies the nonce and contacts an RSA authentication server to verify
the SecurID credentials.
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4.2.2 OFFLOADED KERBEROS AUTHENTICATION REQUESTS
Despite the need for secure and efficient authentication, Kerberos has not become widely de-
ployed on the Web. This is likely because Kerberos is not well-suited for allowing generic web
clients with minimal client configuration to easily authenticate with arbitrary web servers.
Web clients must be aware of the structure of Kerberos realms and must be pre-configured
with the addresses of the KDCs of all realms on the authentication path to the desired web
server. Clients must iteratively authenticate with each KDC before accessing the web server.
Kerberos does not allow caching of Kerberos tickets between clients. If a second client in the
same realm wishes to access the same web server, it needs to iteratively authenticate with all
KDCs again. Iterative authentication adds redundant network communication, extra load
on Kerberos KDCs and extra latency to client web requests.
In this dissertation, we introduce offloaded Kerberos authentication requests that better
utilize cached tickets and require less client configuration (Fig. 18). In this example, C
requests a service ticket for S from the local KDC K1. K1 traverses the authentication path
to obtain a proxy ticket for S. Kerberos proxy tickets allow K1 to delegate to C access rights
for the HTTP service at S. Kn binds the proxy ticket to C’s IP address. K1 returns the
ticket to C, which uses it to access S.
If a client C2 in the same realm R1 wants to authenticate with S, K1 does not need
to traverse the whole authentication path. It uses the cached TGT from Kn−1 to request
from Kn another proxy ticket bound to C2’s IP address. Reusing cached tickets for multiple
clients in the same realm reduces the number of messages and the overhead on the KDCs
for realms R2–Rn−1.
Offloaded Kerberos authentication preserves the security semantics of the existing Ker-
beros protocol. Caching and reusing proxy ticket-granting tickets at the client’s KDC is
similar to caching and reusing TGTs by clients the existing Kerberos protocol. The cached
proxy TGTs remain valid and can be reused until their expiration time. The availability of
the client’s KDC and its resilience to DDoS attacks is discussed in Chapter 7.
Kerberos clients using offloaded authentication without TGT caching experience similar
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Figure 18: Kerberos cross-realm authentication with offloaded requests
latency to clients using iterative authentication because a host (KDC or client) from the
client’s realm must traverse the authentication path to the server and obtain a ticket from
each KDC. Offloaded authentication with TGT caching reduces client request latency when
TGTs for that authentication path have previously been obtained and cached.
4.2.3 KERBEROS CLIENT CONFIGURATION
Offloaded Kerberos authentication requests also reduce the amount of Kerberos client config-
uration. Clients are not aware of intermediate KDCs on the authentication path to a server,
so they do not need the addresses of those KDCs. The existing server principal name canon-
icalization Kerberos extension [114] further reduces client configuration by allowing clients
to request a ticket for a server S without knowing its Kerberos realm or canonical name. For
example, a client can request a service ticket for http/google.com without knowing Google’s
Kerberos realm. This dissertation uses the Kerberos principal name canonicalization exten-
sion.
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4.2.4 KERBEROS CLIENT ANONYMITY
Offloaded Kerberos authentication enables clients to authenticate with web servers using
anonymous Kerberos tickets [135] without explicitly revealing their Kerberos identities. A
client must reveal its identity to the local KDC to authenticate, but the KDC does not
reveal the identity to intermediate KDCs. Anonymous Kerberos tickets [135] allow users
to obtain TGTs and service tickets for an anonymous principal anonymous@R1. If a web
server trusts a KDC to sufficiently authenticate and authorize a client, the server need not
know the client’s Kerberos identity. The proxy service ticket returned to the client is bound
to the client’s IP address to prevent attackers from stealing the Kerberos ticket and gaining
access to the protected web server. It is possible for the server to indirectly identify the
client by this IP address. Anonymous Kerberos tickets provide similar privacy guarantees to
unauthenticated web browsing, where web servers can use clients’ IP addresses, cookies and
other attributes to indirectly identify clients.
Anonymous Kerberos ticket allow the client’s KDC to cache the TGTs and reuse them if
a different client from the same realm requests a service ticket for the same web server. Non-
anonymous TGTs are bound to a known client principal and re-used by the client’s KDC
for other clients. However, the KDC can cache the anonymous TGT from Kn−1. If another
client from the same realm requests a service ticket for the same web server, the KDC can
use the cached TGT and obtain the service ticket without traversing the authentication path
again. This reduces the number of messages exchanged and the load on the intermediate
KDCs.
4.3 EXTENDED SENTINEL DESIGN
Verifying Kerberos tickets can incur additional computational overhead on a web server un-
der a DDoS attack. The server must process bot-originated packets in its network protocol
stack and attempt to verify the Kerberos credentials before dropping the packets. I address
this problem by extending the Sentinel front-end device described in Chapter 3. Using a
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stand-alone Sentinel device deployed in front of the web server also allows using hardware
acceleration without modifying the web server’s hardware configuration. Hardware accelera-
tion allows packet classification and early dropping of bot-originated packets at the hardware
level.
Sentinel parses incoming HTTP and HTTPS requests to verify the Kerberos credentials
in each request. A web browser encodes the Kerberos credentials in an HTTP request as an
HTTP cookie. For authentication over HTTPS, I propose a new TLS Client Hello message
extension that the browser can send the credentials in.
4.3.1 AUTHENTICATION OF HTTP REQUESTS
Sentinel parses every incoming HTTP request and checks it for valid Kerberos credentials.
A Kerberos credential can be reused in multiple HTTP requests, but has a short expiration
period, after which the user must re-authenticate and receive new credentials.
CLIENT SENTINEL SERVER
generate
SYN cookie
TCP SYN
TCP SYN cookie
TCP ACK
HTTP request
verify SYN cookie
verify Kerberos credentials
TCP SYN
TCP SYN ACK
TCP ACK
HTTP request
HTTP response
HTTP response translate TCP sequence number
HTTP request
HTTP response
HTTP request
HTTP response translate TCP sequence number
translate TCP ack number
verify Kerberos credentials
Figure 19: Splicing of HTTP messages over TCP
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Fig. 19 shows the splicing for HTTP messages over TCP. Sentinel intercepts the client
TCP SYN packet and replies with a SYN cookie [45]. Validating SYN cookies is stateless and
prevents attackers from flooding Sentinel with spoofed IP packets. The client then completes
the TCP handshake and send an HTTP request. Sentinel verifies the SYN cookie and the
Kerberos credentials in the HTTP request before establishing a mirror TCP connection
with the web server. The web server’s initial sequence number does not match Sentinel’s
SYN cookie, so Sentinel must translate server-to-client sequence numbers and client-to-server
acknowledgement numbers. Sentinel also parses each HTTP request and verifies its Kerberos
credentials.
4.3.2 AUTHENTICATION OF HTTPS REQUESTS
Verifying Kerberos credentials in HTTP requests is impractical and insufficient for authenti-
cating HTTPS requests over TLS because verifying Kerberos credentials over TLS requires
decrypting and re-encrypting TLS records. This incurs additional overhead on Sentinel and
requires additional configuration, because Sentinel must be able to obtain the TLS session
key. This solution is also insufficient because web servers execute public-key encryption dur-
ing the TLS handshake, i.e. before the transmission of any HTTP requests. An attacker can
deplete the web server’s resources by establishing new TLS connections at a high rate.
I address this problem by encoding the Kerberos credentials in a new TLS extension [46]
of the Client Hello message. The server receives the TLS Client Hello message before dedicat-
ing any computational resources to the new TLS connection. Sentinel verifies the Kerberos
credentials in the TLS Client Hello extension before allowing the TLS handshake to proceed.
Sentinel parses only the first client-originated message on a TCP connection with HTTPS
payload (the Client Hello). Sentinel currently does not support HTTP-to-TLS upgrades or
resumable TLS sessions, where the Client Hello message may occur in the middle of a TCP
connection.
Fig. 20 shows the splicing of HTTPS message over TLS. The mechanism is similar to
the one described in Fig. 19, but Sentinel checks for Kerberos credentials in the TLS Client
Hello message.
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Figure 20: Splicing of HTTPS messages over TLS
4.4 CLIENT INTERFACE: IDENTITY METASYSTEM AND
INFORMATION CARDS
To obtain the Kerberos proxy ticket required by Sentinel to allow access to a protected
server, the client’s web browser must prompt the user for a Kerberos password and an
RSA SecurID token code. I address this problem by integrating the Identity Metasystem
architecture (IdM) with the Kerberos V5 protocol.
4.4.1 IDENTITY METASYSTEM
In the Identity Metasystem (IdM) framework [53], users authenticate with relying parties
using digital identities issued by identity providers. An identity provider issues the user
an information card for each of the user’s digital identities. The information card contains
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information about the identity provider and a number of identity claims that form the digital
identity. For example, a user’s digital identity for medical insurance may consist of claims
about the user’s insurance provider and policy number.
When authenticating, an IdM client obtains the security policy of the relying party (e.g.,
web server) that it wishes to connect to. The policy contains a list of the identity claims
required by the relying party for successful authentication. The client queries the user for
an information card that can provide all required claims. The user chooses an information
card and enters the authentication credentials for the identity provider that issued the card.
The client requests from the identity provider a security token with the required claims and
sends the token to the relying party.
The Identity Metasystem information cards present the user with an intuitive interface for
authentication. Many users already have multiple identities issued by government agencies,
financial and medical institutions. People already often carry with them plastic cards that
represent those identities – e.g., a driver’s license for personal identification, debit/credit
cards that identify their financial accounts, and health insurance cards identifying their
medical insurance information. The Identity Metasystem digital information cards mimic
the appearance and functionality of conventional plastic cards, making authentication more
intuitive for non-expert users.
Digital information cards are not security-sensitive because they only store the descrip-
tions of the claims that the respective identity provider can make and not any assertions
about those claims. An attacker may steal or reproduce a legitimate user’s information card,
but they still need the user’s authentication credentials, such as username and password,
to authenticate with the identity provider and obtain assertions for the information card
claims.
IdM is not a federated authentication scheme, but a framework for implementing such
schemes. The security token contents are treated as opaque and depend on the authentica-
tion scheme used. Clients request security tokens by sending to the authentication provider a
Request Security Token (RST) message that includes authentication credentials. The exist-
ing IdM specification suggests three types of authentication credentials for the RST message:
username/password pair, X.509 client certificate, and Kerberos service ticket. Upon success-
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ful authentication, the provider returns the security token inside a Request Security Token
Response (RSTR) message.
4.4.2 INTEGRATING IDENTITY METASYSTEM WITH KERBEROS
The existing IdM architecture allows Kerberos service tickets to be used as user credentials to
authenticate when requesting a security token. I propose hardware-authenticated Kerberos
proxy tickets as a new type of a security token. A user can requests the new security token
type after obtaining an “RSA SecurID” information card from an identity provider. The
authentication credentials required to obtain the new type of token are the user’s Kerberos
password and RSA SecurID token code. The authentication provider acts the the user’s Ker-
beros KDC, verifies the user’s password and token code, obtains a hardware-authentication
Kerberos proxy ticket, and returns the encoded ticket as an IdM security token.
I extend IdM by adding hardware-authenticated Kerberos proxy tickets as a new security
token type and pre-authenticated AS-REQ messages as a new Request Security Token (RST)
credential type (Fig. 21). The client application queries the user for their Kerberos password
and RSA SecurID token code. It uses the password to generate and encrypt a Kerberos
AS-REQ request with the token code as pre-authentication data. The client sends the pre-
authenticated AS-REQ message in a RST message to the Kerberos KDC, which also acts as
an IdM identity provider. The KDC verifies the AS-REQ message with the user’s Kerberos
password, extracts the SecurID token code and contacts RSA authentication manager to
verify it. Upon success, the Kerberos KDC traverses the authentication path to the desired
web server to obtain an anonymous proxy ticket on behalf of the client, and returns the
ticket as an IdM security token. The client includes the anonymous proxy ticket from the
token with all subsequent requests to the web server.
The existing Identity Metasystem implementations are vulnerable to DoS attacks. Re-
quest Security Token (RST) and Request Security Token Response (RSTR) messages can
be encrypted using either symmetric or asymmetric encryption. The specification, however,
does not provide key exchange mechanisms required for symmetric encryption. Therefore,
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Figure 21: Identity Metasystem architecture integrated with Kerberos V5
most implementations use asymmetric encryption or transmit the RST and RSTR messages
over TLS. Both approaches use public-key cryptography and make the identity provider
vulnerable to DoS attacks. Integrating IdM with Kerberos improves IdM’s resilience to
denial-of-service. The Kerberos ticket in the security token is encrypted using a symmetric
key shared between the client and the webserver’s KDC. The RST and RSTR messages,
therefore, do not need additional protection and the identity provider does not execute any
public-key encryption operations.
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5.0 SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
This chapter describes the implementation of the system architecture described in Chapter
4. I present the network protocol messages I extended to implement the system architec-
ture, the software applications and libraries I used to integrate the system components, and
snapshots of the authentication graphical user interface. Section 5.1 presents details about
the integration of RSA SecurID authentication in the Kerberos V5 protocol. Section 5.2
discusses the implementation of offloaded Kerberos authentication requests. Section 5.3
describes the transmission and verification of Kerberos credentials in HTTP and HTTPS
requests. Section 5.4 presents the integration of Kerberos and RSA SecurID authentication
into the Identity Metasystem and shows snapshots of the user interface.
5.1 INTEGRATING KERBEROS AND HARDWARE TOKEN
AUTHENTICATION
The Kerberos Single-use Authentication Mechanism (SAM) framework [80] extends the Ker-
beros V5 protocol with one-time password authentication mechanisms, such as RSA SecurID
authentication. I ported the SAM framework implementation from the MIT Kerberos li-
brary [10] into Heimdal v1.2 [14]. If a client sends the Kerberos KDC an AS-REQ request
without pre-authentication, the KDC checks a new hwauth required flag I added to the KDC
configuration file to decide whether hardware pre-authentication is required. If it is, the
KDC responds with a SAM challenge encoded in the PADATA field of a KRB ERROR mes-
sage (Fig. 17), requesting the client to authenticate with a hardware token. Hardware token
codes are an example of single-use authentication data (SAD). Listing 5.1 shows the ASN.1
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format of the hardware authentication SAM challenge:
 sam-type: the type of SAM required, set to PA SAM TYPE SECURID.
 sam-flags : bitmap of flags indicating whether the SAD is known by the KDC and should
be used as a shared key, or it should be encrypted using a different shared key known by
the KDC. RSA SecurID authentication uses the send-encrypted-sad flag, which indicates
that the KDC does not know the SAD (hardware token code) and the client must send
it encrypted with a shared key derived from the user’s Kerberos password.
 sam-nonce: a random nonce to prevent attackers from replaying the SAM challenge or
response.
 sam-etype: encryption algorithm to encrypt the SecurID token code with.
Listing 5.1: ASN.1 format of SAM challenge
PA−SAM−CHALLENGE−2−BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
sam−type [ 0 ] INTEGER (0 . . 4294967295 ) ,
sam−f l a g s [ 1 ] SAMFlags ,
. . .
sam−nonce [ 8 ] INTEGER (0 . . 4 294967295 ) ,
sam−etype [ 9 ] INTEGER (0 . . 4294967295 ) ,
}
Upon receipt of the SAM challenge, the client queries the user for the Kerberos password
and SecurID token code. It derives the shared key from the user’s password and encrypts the
SecurID token code and SAM challenge nonce. The client sends a SAM response (Listing
5.2) encoded in the PADATA of a new AS-REQ message:
 sam-type: matches the SAM challenge type, set to
PA SAM TYPE SECURID.
 sam-flags : match the SAM challenge flags, set to send-encrypted-sad.
 sam-enc-nonce-or-sad : SAM SAD and nonce encrypted with the shared key derived from
the user’s password.
Listing 5.2: ASN.1 format of SAM response
PA−SAM−RESPONSE−2 : := SEQUENCE {
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sam−type [ 0 ] INTEGER (0 . . 4294967295 ) ,
sam−f l a g s [ 1 ] SAMFlags ,
. . .
sam−enc−nonce−or−sad [ 3 ] EncryptedData ,
−− PA−ENC−SAM−RESPONSE−ENC
. . .
}
PA−ENC−SAM−RESPONSE−ENC : := SEQUENCE {
sam−nonce [ 0 ] INTEGER (0 . . 4 294967295 ) ,
sam−sad [ 1 ] Genera lSt r ing OPTIONAL,
. . .
}
Upon receipt of the SAM response, the KDC derives the shared key from the user’s
Kerberos password, decrypts the encrypted data, and verifies the nonce. It then sends the
SecurID token code to the RSA Authentication Manager for verification. For this implemen-
tation, I used the RSA Authentication Manager v7.0 and the RSA SecurID authentication
agent. The authentication agent is implemented as a Linux Pluggable Authentication Mod-
ule (PAM). I extended the Heimdal Kerberos KDC to interact with the authentication agent
via the Linux libpam API. The authentication agent communicates with the authentication
manager over the network using a proprietary UDP protocol.
5.2 OFFLOADED KERBEROS AUTHENTICATION REQUESTS
Kerberos client principals can obtain proxy tickets and delegate the authentication credentials
to a different principal to access the service from their name. For example, a client may access
a front-end server F , which requires service from a backend server B. The client obtains
a proxy service ticket for B and passes it to F , which accesses B from the client’s name.
Kerberos proxy tickets are bound to a service and the client’s proxy ticket only grants access
to B. Therefore, F cannot use the ticket to access a different server from the client’s name.
I use the Kerberos ticket proxy flag to implement offloaded Kerberos authentication
requests in the Heimdal Kerberos v1.2 library [14]. The client requests an anonymous, proxy
ticket by setting the proxiable and anonymous flags in the hardware pre-authenticated AS-
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REQ request to the KDC. The KDC verifies the pre-authentication and passes the request
to a new kdcproxy service that I implemented. kdcproxy extracts the authentication path
from the KDC configuration file and obtains ticket-granting tickets from each intermediate
KDC on the path using standard Kerberos V5 messages. kdcproxy then obtains from the
web server’s KDC an anonymous, proxy service ticket bound to the client’s IP, and returns
it to the client.
5.3 VERIFYING KERBEROS CREDENTIALS IN HTTP AND HTTPS
TRAFFIC
The client sends the Base64 encoded Kerberos ticket inside the Cookie HTTP header line of
each HTTP request (Listing 5.3). Sentinel parses the HTTP request and locates the Sentinel
cookie. If a valid cookie is not found, Sentinel returns to the client an HTML page suggesting
that the client pre-authenticates to access the web server.
Listing 5.3: HTTP request with Sentinel cookie
GET / HTTP/1 .1
Host : www. d d o s r e s i l i e n t . com
User−Agent : Moz i l l a /5 .0 (X11 ; U; Linux i686 ; en−US; rv : 1 . 9 . 0 . 5 )
Gecko/2013041720 F i r e f ox / 3 . 0 . 5
Accept : t ex t /html , app l i c a t i o n /xhtml+xml , app l i c a t i o n /xml ; q=0.9 ,*/* ; q=0.8
Accept−Language : en−us , en ; q=0.5
Accept−Encoding : gzip , d e f l a t e
Accept−Charset : ISO−8859−1, utf −8;q=0.7 ,* ; q=0.7
Connection : c l o s e
Cookie : Sent ine lCook i e=boICEzCCAg+gAwIBBaEDAgEOogcDBQAAAAAAo4IBamGC
. . . <Base64 encoded cookie > . . .
P0Qw==
When using HTTPS, the client encodes the Kerberos ticket inside a novel TLS Client
Hello “kerberos credential”. TLS v1.2 [62] defines the format of TLS Hello extensions (List-
ing 5.4). Each extension has a type and variable-length opaque data. Public extension type
numbers are assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).
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Listing 5.4: TLS Hello message extension format
s t r u c t {
ExtensionType ex t en s i on type ;
opaque extens ion data <0..2ˆ16−1>;
} Extension ;
Listings 5.5 and 5.6 describe the format of the TLS “kerberos credential” extension. I use
non-public TLS extension type 36 for this implementation. The extension data containing
the Base64 Kerberos ticket has variable length and can occupy up to 65535 bytes. The
“kerberos credential” extension is backwards-compatible with the TLS protocol because the
TLS extension specification [46] requires servers to process and ignore unrecognized TLS
extensions.
Listing 5.5: TLS “kerberos credential” extension type
enum {
k e r b e r o s c r e d e n t i a l ( 36 ) , (65535)
} ExtensionType ;
Listing 5.6: TLS “kerberos credential” extension data
s t r u c t {
opaque k e rb c r ed en t i a l <1..2ˆ16−1>;
} KerberosCredentia lExtData ;
I implemented the “kerberos credential” extension in the Network Security Services
(NSS) 3.12 library that provides the TLS implementation used in the Mozilla Firefox 3.0.5
web browser. The Personal Security Manager (PSM) Firefox component acts as the interface
between NSS and the other Firefox components. The NSS API allows PSM to register call-
back functions that NSS calls during the TLS handshake. I extended PSM and the NSS API
with a Sentinel cookie lookup callback function. When sending a Client Hello message, NSS
calls the registered function. PSM searches Firefox’s HTTP cookie cache and returns the
result to NSS. If a Sentinel cookie was found, NSS adds the “kerberos credential” extension
with the encoded Kerberos ticket to the outgoing Client Hello message.
Sentinel intercepts the TLS Client Hello and checks for the “kerberos credential” exten-
sion. If the extension is not found or does not contain a valid Kerberos ticket, Sentinel
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responds to the Client Hello with a fatal TLS alert. The DigitalMe Firefox extension inter-
cepts the TLS alert and queries the user to pre-authenticate with an RSA SecurID token.
5.4 IDENTITY METASYSTEM AND INFORMATION CARD
INTEGRATION
This implementation integrates Kerberos and RSA SecurID authentication into the Bandit-
Projct identity provider and the DigitalMe identity selector [2]. The Bandit Project identity
provider is a Java application running on the Apache Tomcat web server. DigitalMe is the
Bandit Project’s identity selector application. It is a standalone software application, but
also provides a Firefox extension for launching the application within the web browser.
5.4.1 INFORMATION CARD EXTENSIONS
Identity Metasystem information cards contain metadata about the identify provider that
issues them. The metadata includes lists of token types and identity claims supported
by the provider. I implemented RSA SecurIDs as a new type of information card that
uses hardware-authenticated Kerberos proxy tickets as security token and identity claim
(Listings 5.7 and 5.8). To use this card, the IdM client queries the user for their Kerberos
password and SecurID token code, generates a hardware pre-authenticated Kerberos AS-
REQ message an sends the AS-REQ as an authentication credential in the security token
request.
Listing 5.7: Supported token types in information card
<ic :SupportedTokenTypeList>
<trust:TokenType
xmlns : t ru s t=” ht tp : // schemas . xmlsoap . org /ws/2005/02/ t r u s t ”>
ht tp : //www. cs . p i t t . edu/Kerb5HWAuthProxyTicket
</ trust:TokenType>
</ ic :SupportedTokenTypeList>
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Listing 5.8: Supported claim types in information card
<i c :SupportedCla imTypeList>
<ic :SupportedClaimType
Uri=” ht tp : // cs . p i t t . edu/HWAuthKerbProxyTicket”>
<i c :D i sp layTag>
Kerberos Creden t i a l s
</ i c :D i sp layTag>
< i c :D e s c r i p t i o n>
Kerberos Creden t i a l s
</ i c :D e s c r i p t i o n>
</ ic:SupportedClaimType>
</ ic :SupportedCla imTypeList>
5.4.2 SECURITY TOKEN REQUEST AND RESPONSE EXTENSIONS
IdM clients send Request Security Token (RST) messages to authenticate with the identity
provider and request a security token. The identity provider verifies the authentication cre-
dentials, and returns the security token with the desired claims inside a Request Security
Token Response (RSTR) message. In the existing IdM protocol, the identity provider pro-
tects the integrity of the security token using a “proof key”, which can be symmetric or
asymmetric depending on the type of security token used. I extend the RSTR message to
add a hardware-accelerated Kerberos proxy ticket as a new security token type. Kerberos
tickets are encrypted and have a built-in integrity protection mechanism. Therefore, the new
security token type I propose does not require a proof key for integrity protection and it is
not used in the extended RSTR message.
Listing 5.9 shows a sample RST message requesting a Kerberos proxy ticket as a security
token. The KeyType field indicates that no proof key is required.
Listing 5.9: Request Security Token message
<wst:RequestSecur ityToken
xmlns:wst=” ht tp : // schemas . xmlsoap . org /ws/2005/02/ t r u s t ”
Context=”ProcessRequestSecur ityToken ”>
<wst:RequestType>
ht tp : // schemas . xmlsoap . org /ws/2005/02/ t r u s t / I s su e
</wst:RequestType>
<wst:TokenType>
ht tp : //www. cs . p i t t . edu/Kerb5HWAuthProxyTicket
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</wst:TokenType>
<wst:KeyType>
ht tp : // schemas . xmlsoap . org /ws/2005/05/ i d e n t i t y /NoProofKey
</wst:KeyType>
. . .
<wst:Claims D ia l e c t=” ht tp : // schemas . xmlsoap . org /ws/2005/05/ i d e n t i t y ”>
<wsid:ClaimType
xmlns:wsid=” ht tp : // schemas . xmlsoap . org /ws/2005/05/ i d e n t i t y ”
Uri=” ht tp : // cs . p i t t . edu/HWAuthKerbProxyTicket”/>
</wst :Cla ims>
. . .
</wst :RequestSecur ityToken>
The identity provider passes the AS-REQ message to the Kerberos KDC for verification.
The KDC verifies the RSA SecurID pre-authentication, obtains a proxy Kerberos service
ticket for the desired web server, and returns the ticket to the IdM identity provider. The
provider encodes the ticket into a security token and returns it to the client inside the RSTR
message (Listing 5.10).
Listing 5.10: Request Security Token Response message
<RequestSecurityTokenResponse
xmlns=” ht tp : // schemas . xmlsoap . org /ws/2005/02/ t r u s t ”
Context=”ProcessRequestSecur ityToken ”>
<wst:TokenType
xmlns:wst=” ht tp : // schemas . xmlsoap . org /ws/2005/02/ t r u s t ”>
ht tp : //www. cs . p i t t . edu/Kerb5HWAuthProxyTicket
</wst:TokenType>
<wst:RequestedSecur ityToken
xmlns:wst=” ht tp : // schemas . xmlsoap . org /ws/2005/02/ t r u s t ”>
< . . . encoded Kerberos proxy t i c k e t . . .>
</wst :RequestedSecur ityToken>
</RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
5.5 USER INTERFACE
This section presents the authentication user interface in the Mozilla Firefox browser and
DigitalMe identity selector. The interface snapshots are organized in the order that the user
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sees them.
5.5.1 SENTINEL RESPONSE TO UNAUTHENTICATED HTTP REQUESTS
When a user requests a web page from a web server, e.g., http://www.ddosresilient.com, that
is protected by a Sentinel front-end device currently under a DoS attack, Sentinel checks the
HTTP request for a valid Kerberos service ticket. If a valid ticket is not found, Sentinel re-
sponds with a web page (Fig. 22), which alerts the user of the high server load and suggests
pre-authentication before receiving service. The user can click on the “Learn More” button
to obtain more information, or try to access the web server again later.
Sentinel responds with this web page to both client and bot HTTP requests without valid
credentials. A botnet generating dummy HTTP requests at high rate can force Sentinel to
Figure 22: HTTP response from Sentinel during a DDoS attack
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Figure 23: Pre-authentication query
respond with web pages at the same rate. Therefore, the web page returned must be small so
as to deplete only a minimum amount of Sentinel’s network bandwidth. Sentinel’s response
should fit into a single Ethernet frame to reduce the resources Sentinel spends on responding
to a bot request.
Sentinel responds with this web page only to HTTP requests. If a client initiates a TLS
connection without valid credentials, Sentinel responds with a TLS alert message. Firefox
detects and processes the TLS alert without displaying the pre-authentication notice page.
5.5.2 IDENTITY SELECTOR QUERY DIALOG WINDOW
The DigitalMe Firefox extension displays a dialog window with further information to the
user (Fig. 23). The dialog explains that the desired web server is likely under attack and
queries the user to pre-authenticate using an RSA SecurID token. The user can choose to
pre-authenticate or cancel the request.
If the user chooses to pre-authenticate, the Firefox extension launches the DigitalMe
identity selector (Fig. 24), which queries the user for an information card. The identity
selector shows all information cards that can provide the identity claim required by Sentinel
– a hardware-authenticated Kerberos proxy ticket. If the information card provides more
claims than Sentinel requires, the user can uncheck the claims that should not be requested
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Figure 24: DigitalMe card selector
from the identity provider.
The DigitalMe window is resilient to interface spoofing attacks. The dark background
in Fig. 24 shows the identity selector’s security desktop. The security desktop is a modal
window that covers the user’s desktop space. This prevents malicious web scripts or applica-
tions from queries the user with spoofed windows that mimic the DigitalMe identity selector
dialogs. Resilience to interface spoofing is important in the context of federated authentica-
tion because obtaining a single set of credentials gives an attacker access to multiple service
providers.
When the user selects the RSA SecurID information card, the identity selector queries
the user for their Kerberos password and SecurID token code (Fig. 25). DigitalMe then
generates the hardware pre-authenticated Kerberos AS-REQ message and sends it with the
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Figure 25: Kerberos/SecurID authentication dialog
security token request to the identity provider. The identity provider authenticates the user
and returns the Kerberos proxy ticket, which the DigitalMe Firefox extension saves in the
Firefox HTTP cookie store for subsequent HTTP/HTTPS requests.
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6.0 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This chapter evaluates Sentinel’s ability to mitigate distributed denial-of-service attacks
against HTTP and HTTPS servers. I generate HTTP and TLS flood attacks at variable
rates, and compare the resilience of Sentinel to that of a standard web server running on
the same hardware platform as Sentinel. The performance experiments also evaluate the
experience of legitimate human users accessing the web server during the attack. I compare
the Sentinel performance and legitimate user experience using two different forms of authen-
tication implemented in Sentinel: CAPTCHA puzzles and RSA SecurID authentication.
Section 6.1 describes the experimental setup for my performance tests. Section 6.2
presents the experimental design. Section 6.3 evaluates the resilience of a standard web server
against HTTP request floods. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 compare the performance of Sentinel us-
ing CAPTCHA authentication with, respectively, dynamically generated and pre-generated
puzzles. Sections 6.6 and 6.7 evaluate Sentinel using RSA SecurID authentication without
and with hardware-accelerated blacklisting, respectively. Sections 6.8 and 6.9 compare the
performance of a standard web server host and the Sentinel front-end device using RSA
SecurID authentication against floods of TLS requests.
6.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Fig. 26 shows the experimental setup for the performance experiments in this chapter. Two
8-port HP ProCurve 1800G gigabit Ethernet switches S1 and S2 are connected to each other
via a 1Gbps link. Six attacker hosts are connected via 1Gbps links to switch S1. Switch
S2 connects the RSA Authentication Manager server and hosts belonging to two different
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Kerberos realms – client.com and ddosresilient.com. The client.com Kerberos realm consists
of the legitimate client host and the client’s KDC, which are connected to S2 via 100Mbps
links. The ddosresilient.com domain contains Sentinel, the ddosresilient.com web server and
the web server’s KDC. The ddosresilient.com KDC is connected to S2 via a 100Mbps link.
Sentinel’s NFE I-8000 card and a standard Ethernet network card are connected to S2 via
1Gbps links. Sentinel’s NFE I-8000 is also connected to the ddosresilient.com web server.
The RSA Authentication Manger is connected to switch S2 via a 100Mbps link.
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Figure 26: Experimental setup
The hosts’ hardware and software configuration is as follows:
 Legitimate client: Firefox 3.05 with DigitalMe extension installed on an HP Pavillion
zx5000 laptop with Intel Pentium 4 CPU at 3.06 GHz, 2GB RAM, and Fedora 10 Linux.
 Sentinel: Sentinel application, NFM 2.0 and NFD 1.2.3 installed on a Dell Dimension
9200 with dual-core Intel Pentium Core Duo at 2.4GHz, 2GB RAM, NFE-I8000 card,
and Fedora Core 7 Linux. I turned off one of the CPU cores to facilitate performance
measurements. In experiments where the DDoS attack target is a web server host, nginx
1.2.8 with OpenSSL 0.9.8i run on the Sentinel device.
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 Web server: Apache 2.2.10 and OpenSSL 0.9.8g installed on a Dell Dimension 4550 with
Intel Pentium 4 CPU at 2.4 GHz, 256MB RAM, and Fedora 10 Linux. This is the back-
end web server behind Sentinel and it is only used in performance tests where Sentinel
mitigates the DDoS attack.
 Kerberos client.com and ddosresilient.com KDCs: extended versions of Heimdal v1.2
installed on two Dell Dimension 4550 with Intel Pentium 4 at 2.4 GHz, 256MB RAM,
and Fedora 10 Linux.
 RSA authentication server: RSA Authentication Manager v7.1.2 installed on Dell Pow-
erEdge 1600SC with quad-core Intel Xeon CPU at 2.4GHz, 3GB RAM and RHEL 4
Linux.
 Attackers 1-4: modified version of BoNeSi 0.2.0 [4] installed on Dell Optiplex 380 with
dual-core Intel Core2 Duo CPU at 3.06GHz, 4GB RAM and CentOS 6.4 Linux.
 Attackers 5-6: modified version of BoNeSi 0.2.0 installed on Dell PowerEdge T105 with
quad-core AMD Opteron 1352 CPU, 4GB RAM, and Fedora 10 Linux.
6.1.1 DDOS ATTACK GENERATION WITH BONESI
The DDoS Botnet Simulator (BoNeSi) is a DDoS attack generation tool developed by the
German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence [4]. BoNeSi can generate HTTP floods
from a pre-configured set of IP addresses to a pre-configured set of URLs. It uses the
libnet and libpcap Linux libraries to, respectively, inject IP packets into and receive IP
packets from the IP layer of the Linux kernel network stack. During an HTTP flood attack,
BoNesi establishes a TCP connection and sends an HTTP request to the target URL with a
“Connection: close” header line (Fig. 27). The header line instructs the web server to close
the TCP connection immediately after sending the HTTP response.
I extended BoNeSi to generate floods of TLS connections that use ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman (eDH) key exchange. In such a TLS connection, BoNeSi sends a TLS Client Hello
message to the server and advertises that it only supports TLS cipher suites using eDH key
exchange (Fig. 28). The TLS server must pick one of the cipher suites advertised by the client.
The server responds with Server Hello, Server Certificate and Server Key Exchange messages.
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Figure 28: Bot TLS connection
The Server Certificate contains an X.509 certificate with the server’s RSA public key. The
Server Key Exchange message contains a randomly generated ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key
signed by the server’s RSA private key. Generating the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key and the
RSA signature are both computationally intensive operations that allow BoNeSi to deplete
the TLS server’s CPU capacity with a small number of requests. BoNeSi waits for the Server
Key Exchange message and immediately terminates the TCP connection.
6.1.2 WEB SERVER PAGES
.
Fig. 29 and 30 show the web pages returned by, respectively, the Sentinel-protected and
the standalone web server. The sizes of the HTML pages are 195 bytes and 205 bytes,
respectively. Each HTML page contains two images – a 45507-byte University of Pittsburgh
logo PNG image and a 5031-byte “PITT” text JPEG image. I disabled HTTP pipelining in
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Figure 29: Web page from web server behind
Sentinel
Figure 30: Web page from standalone web
server
Firefox on the legitimate client host to force it to use a new TCP connection to download
each file. When accessing the web pages over TLS, the browser will also establish a new
TLS connection for each request. Having multiple files to download from the web server and
using different TCP and TLS connections for each file mimics the browser downloading a
real-world web page consisting of multiple files possibly hosted on more than one web server.
The minimal size and number of objects of the web pages was chosen to facilitate the
performance experiments. A higher number of larger objects retrieved by legitimate clients
would increase the probability of dropped packets and should cause increased response times
for legitimate client requests. The performance results in this chapter show that the web
pages used are large enough to trigger packet loss and increased legitimate client response
times under heave DDoS attack load.
6.2 PERFORMANCE EXPERIMENT DESIGN
I measure three performance metrics during all performance experiments to evaluate Sen-
tinel’s resilience to DDoS attacks and the attack’s effect on legitimate client requests:
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 DDoS attack target CPU utilization: I measure the utilization of the Intel Pentium Core
Duo CPU on the Sentinel hardware platform, which runs the Sentinel application or a
standard web server. During DDoS attacks that target the host CPU resources, CPU
utilization indicates the ability of the target to scale to higher attack rates. I take CPU
utilization measurements once every 15 seconds during the test.
 Network bandwidth consumed by attack : I measure the amount of bi-directional network
traffic generated during the DDoS attack. For attacks where the network infrastructure
of the target is the performance bottleneck, the network bandwidth indicates the ability
of the target’s network to scale to higher DDoS attack rates. I measure the consumed
network bandwidth by querying the statistic counters for the port of switch S2 that is
connected to switch S1 via SNMP every 15 seconds (Fig. 26). This guarantees that only
traffic from and to the attacker hosts will be measured.
 Response time of legitimate client requests : I collect packet captures of legitimate client
requests on the client host and measure the response time to download the web page from
the web server. For experiments that use CAPTCHA and hardware token authentication,
I also measure the response time to obtain, respectively, a CAPTCHA puzzle, or a pre-
authentication notice HTML page. High response times while the target is under attack
indicate that the legitimate client’s packets get queued up and/or dropped before getting
processed. The ideal scenario is one where the DDoS attack is mitigated sufficiently
that it does not affect the response time of legitimate clients accessing the web server
under attack. High response times to access web pages results in legitimate users giving
up trying to access the web server under attack. A recent survey shows that 40% of
consumers would abandon a web site if it does not load within 3 seconds [25].
An additional metric that I do not consider in this performance analysis is the false
positive rate of Sentinel’s Bloom filter. The Bloom filter parameters (number of buckets,
number of bits per bucket, number of hash functions) were chosen to minimize the false
positive rate. Section 3.4 presents the chosen parameter values and the approximate false
positive rate computed based on these values.
For all performance metrics, I record 20 repetitions of each data point. I plot the perfor-
mance data using box-and-whisker plots where the box plot shows the 25th, 50th and 75th
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Figure 31: Sample box plot
percentiles, the whiskers show the 10th and 90th percentiles, and a separate star shows the
mean of the 20 repetitions (Fig. 31).
Table 1 shows a list of variable and fixed parameters for this dissertation’s performance
experiments. The attack rate measured in requests/second is the main variable parameter.
I compare the performance of Sentinel and a standard web server under both HTTP and
TLS flood attacks. When testing against Sentinel, I compare the performance of CAPTCHA
puzzles and hardware token authentication. I also discuss the performance of dynamically
generating CAPTCHA puzzles during the attack and pre-generating them in advance. All
performance experiments use a fixed number of 6000 simulated bot IP addresses – the max-
imum IP addresses I could simulate on the six attacker hosts without affecting negatively
the performance of the BoNeSi attack generation tool.
Given the list of variable parameters above, we defined a set of performance experiments
for this dissertation. The rest of this chapter chapter presents and analyzes the results from
the following experiments:
 HTTP flood against standard web server (Section 6.3)
 HTTP flood against Sentinel with dynamic CAPTCHA authentication and no blacklist-
ing (Section 6.4)
70
Attack rate Fixed / variable Possible values
Attack type Variable HTTP or TLS flood
Attack target Variable Standard web server or Sentinel
Authentication type Variable CAPTCHA puzzles or hardware tokens
CAPTCHA generation option Variable Dynamically generated or pre-generated
Number of bot IP addresses Fixed 6000
Web pages for HTTP GET requests Fixed Described in Section 6.1
Table 1: Variable and fixed parameters for performance experiments
 HTTP flood against Sentinel with pre-generated CAPTCHA authentication and no
blacklisting (Section 6.5)
 HTTP flood against Sentinel with hardware authentication and no blacklisting (Sec-
tion 6.6)
 HTTP flood against Sentinel with hardware authentication and blacklisting (Section 6.7)
 TLS flood against standard web server (Section 6.8)
 TLS flood against Sentinel with hardware authentication and no blacklisting (Section 6.9)
I intentionally omit performance experiments with CAPTCHA authentication and black-
listing, as well as with HTTPS floods, hardware token authentication and blacklisting be-
cause blacklisting in independent of the authentication mechanism and the type of application-
level flood. The experiment using HTTP floods, hardware token authentication, and black-
listing presented in Section 6.7 shows that the performance data before Sentinel has started
blacklisting is similar to the data collected when blacklisting is not used at all (Section 6.6).
At 19,000 requests/second during both experiments, the results show 193 Mbps of consumed
network bandwidth and 98% Sentinel CPU utilization. Once Sentinel blacklists all bots’ IP
addresses, the DDoS attack is reduced to a SYN flood. The bots’ SYN packets are dropped
on Sentinel’s network acceleration card and the bots never complete the TCP handshakes
to send application-level requests or receive authentication challenges.
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6.3 HTTP FLOOD ATTACKS AGAINST WEB SERVERS
Fig. 32 shows the CPU utilization of a standalone nginx web server running on Sentinel’s
hardware platform. The portion of CPU capacity consumed initially increases linearly with
the DDoS attack rate. At 16,000 HTTP requests per second, BoNeSi depletes the web
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Figure 32: Experiment 6.3 – CPU utilization
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Figure 33: Experiment 6.3 – response time to
get page
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Figure 34: Experiment 6.3 – network band-
width
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server’s CPU capacity and the CPU utilization reaches 95%. When the attack rate increases
to 19,000 requests/second, nginx does not have sufficient CPU resources to service all HTTP
requests at the rate they are received. The SYN packet backlog queue for nginx’ listening
socket in the kernel network stack fills up and the server starts discarding SYN packets from
bots. This slightly reduces the load on the CPU and the CPU utilization decreases to 90%.
However, the web server’s kernel at this time also discards SYN packets from legitimate
clients. Fig. 33 shows the legitimate client’s response time to download the web page from
the server during the DDoS attack. When the attack rate reaches 19,000 requests/second
and nginx’ SYN packet backlog queue fills up, the response times become higher and more
variable. The Linux kernel on the client host uses the kernel’s 3-second timeout before
retransmitting a SYN packet, making most high client response times in multiples of 3
seconds. The 3-second timeout is a standard default parameter compiled into the Linux
kernel and was originally recommended by RFC1122 as initial retransmission timeout for
new TCP connections [48].
The DDoS attack depletes the web server’s CPU capacity before it reaches the server’s
1Gbps network connection capacity. Fig. 34 show the network bandwidth consumed by
the attack. At 16,000 requests per second, the attack generates just 142Mbps of network
traffic. When the web server discards bot-originated SYN packets at 19,000 requests/sec,
the bots are unable to complete as many connections and the bandwidth decreases slightly
to 139Mbps.
This experiment demonstrates the ability of HTTP floods to deplete a web server’s CPU
capacity with modest amount of network traffic. Web server administrators can adjust the
Linux kernel network stack parameters, e.g., increase the TCP SYN packet backlog queue
size, but the web server application is unable to keep up with the rate of incoming HTTP
requests and a persistent DDoS attack will eventually cause the queue to overflow.
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Figure 35: Experiment 6.4 – CPU utilization
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Figure 36: Experiment 6.4 – network band-
width
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Figure 37: Experiment 6.4 – response time to
get CAPTCHA
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Figure 38: Experiment 6.4 – response time to
get page
6.4 HTTP FLOOD ATTACKS AND CAPTCHA AUTHENTICATION
WITH DYNAMICALLY GENERATED PUZZLES
CAPTCHA puzzle generation is a critical part of CAPTCHA authentication. If the target
of a DDoS attack chooses to dynamically generate CAPTCHA puzzles, it must generate
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Image format Latency Encoded image size
24-bit PNG 11.7 msecs 2190 bytes
8-bit PNG 45 msecs 1102 bytes
GIF 129 msecs 976 bytes
JPEG 11 msecs 2059 bytes
Table 2: CAPTCHA image format comparison
them at the same rate as the rate of the DDoS attack. This places additional computation
load on a server already low on CPU resources. If the server chooses to pre-load a pool of
pre-generated CAPTCHA puzzles, it risks having to re-use the puzzles if the DDoS attack
rate is high enough to get all puzzles in the server’s pool. Puzzle reuse is not as secure
because the attacker can solve all of the server’s puzzles out-of-band and then re-use the
responses to launch a DDoS attack.
I implemented CAPTCHA authentication in Sentinel with both dynamically generated
and pre-generated CAPTCHA puzzles. There are no standard or widely adopted algorithms
for on-server CAPTCHA puzzle generation. Many web servers use the reCAPTCHA ser-
vice [12] to provide clients with pre-generated reCAPTCHA puzzles, but reCAPTCHA’s
puzzle generation algorithms are not publicly known. I implemented in Sentinel a routine
that generates 5-character puzzles using the ImageMagick API [8]. Through performance
profiling, I determined that encoding the puzzle into the respective image format consumes
nearly 90% of the latency for generating a single puzzle. I tested the encoding latency and
the Base64 encoding size of the produced image for different image formats (Table 2).
None of the ImageMagic image encoding algorithms tested are fast enough for Sentinel to
dynamically generate CAPTCHA puzzles for each intercepted bot request. For this experi-
ment, I chose the 8-bit PNG image encoding. The current Sentinel implementation sends its
HTTP response and CAPTCHA puzzle in two Ethernet frames. For performance reasons,
the TCP segment in each Ethernet frame has a maximum size of 1000 bytes. The 24-bit PNG
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and JPEG encoding algorithms are faster than 8-bit PNG encoding, but not fast enough to
generate puzzles for high-rate DDoS attacks and the produced images do not fit into the two
1000-byte TCP segments available. There is no publicly known explanation why 8-bit PNG
encoding in ImageMagick is faster than 24-bit PNG encoding. A possible explanation may
be the additional downsampling required to encode an image into 8-bit PNG format.
Fig. 35 shows the CPU utilization of Sentinel under attack while generating dynamic
CAPTCHA puzzles. Sentinel’s CPU is consumed when the attack rate reaches 24 connec-
tions/second, which is explained by the 45 milliseconds it takes to encode an 8-bit PNG
image. The CPU utilization values measured for this experiment have higher variance be-
cause the legitimate client requests are not spread evenly during the test. A single legitimate
client request can consume a noticeable amount of CPU cycles when Sentinel’s CPU can
process only 24 requests/second. Fig. 36 shows that the DDoS attack generates only up to
0.55Mbps of traffic. This is due to the low attack rate sufficient to consume Sentinel’s CPU
capacity. Each bot connection generates approximately 2,559 bytes of network traffic, so 24
requests/second should generate approximately 0.49Mbps of network traffic. Fig. 37 and 38
show the legitimate client response times, respectively, to get a CAPTCHA puzzle and to
download the web page after correctly solving the CAPTCHA. As Sentinel’s CPU utilization
increases above 90% at 21 bot requests/second, the legitimate client response times increase
and have higher variability.
6.5 HTTP FLOOD ATTACKS AND CAPTCHA AUTHENTICATION
WITH PRE-GENERATED PUZZLES
Because there are no standard or widely-adopted mechanisms for CAPTCHA puzzle gener-
ation, it is infeasible to design a representative experiment for dynamic CAPTCHA gener-
ation. In a best-case performance scenario, Sentinel would respond to HTTP requests with
CAPTCHA puzzles without spending CPU cycles for puzzle generation. I implemented a
Sentinel mode, where Sentinel pre-generates 100 CAPTCHA images at start-up time and
serves them in round-robin order. Pre-generated CAPTCHA puzzles provide less security
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Figure 39: Experiment 6.5 – CPU utilization
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Figure 40: Experiment 6.5 – network band-
width
against DDoS attacks because the attacker can fetch all puzzles from Sentinel’s pool, solve
them out-of-band, and use the answers to stage a new DDoS attack that bypasses the
CAPTCHA authentication defense mechanism. The attacker can store puzzle answers in
hash tables and use constant-time lookup algorithm to fetch answers for puzzles issued by
Sentinel.
I did not vary the size of the CAPTCHA table in this experiment because the algorithms
to fetch the next puzzle and lookup a puzzle’s expected answer execute in constant O(1)
time. Sentinel keeps track of the index of the next available puzzle and encodes it into the
HTML form that the client submits with the puzzle answer. The size of the CAPTCHA table
also has limited effect on the ability of Sentinel to filter out bot-originated HTTP requests.
A large botnet generating requests at high rate can force Sentinel to use all pre-generated
CAPTCHAs in a short period of time. For example, a botnet generating a DDoS attack at
20,000 HTTP requests per second will force a Sentinel device with 1 million pre-generated
CAPTCHAs to use all puzzles in just 50 seconds.
Fig. 39 shows the CPU utilization of Sentinel under attack when using pre-generated
CAPTCHA puzzles. In this experiment, Sentinel scales better to higher DDoS attack rates
– it takes approximately 15,000 requests to consume its CPU capacity. Sentinel’s HTTP
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Figure 42: Experiment 6.5 – response time to
get page
response to each bot request has a size of 1557 bytes. This explains why Sentinel with
CAPTCHA authentication does not scale as well as the standard web server (Section 6.3),
which responds with 195 bytes of HTTP data and can handle 16,000 bot requests/second.
Fig. 40 shows the bandwidth consumed by the DDoS attack. Each bot connection on the
average generated 2436 bytes of network traffic. This number is slightly lower than the
2,559 bytes per bot connection when Sentinel uses dynamically generated CAPTCHAs. In
this experiment, BoNeSi generates a higher amount of traffic overall, which increases the
probability of packet drops and incomplete bot requests.
6.6 HTTP FLOOD ATTACKS AND HARDWARE TOKEN
AUTHENTICATION
This section evaluates the ability of Sentinel with hardware token authentication to miti-
gate DDoS attacks. Sentinel responds to HTTP requests with an HTML page suggesting
hardware token pre-authentication. Fig. 43 shows the CPU utilization of Sentinel under
attack. Sentinel scales better than when using CAPTCHA authentication – BoNeSi needs
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Figure 43: Experiment 6.6 – CPU utilization
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Figure 44: Experiment 6.6 – network band-
width
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Figure 45: Experiment 6.6 – response time to
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Figure 46: Experiment 6.6 – response time to
get page
to generate 19,000 requests/second to deplete Sentinel’s CPU capacity. Sentinel’s response
in this experiment contains 630 bytes of HTTP data, compared to the 1557 bytes of data
returned when using CAPTCHA authentication. Fig. 44 shows the bandwidth consumed by
the DDoS attack. At 19,000 requests/second, the attack generates 193 Mbps of bi-direction
traffic. Fig. 45 and 46 present the response time of the legitimate client to, respectively,
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obtain the pre-authentication notice page and download the web page after authenticating.
At 20,000 requests/second the response time to obtain the web page become high and very
variable.
During this experiment, Sentinel does not use hardware-accelerated blacklisting. It per-
forms some of the same tasks that a standard web server performs—receives packets, parses
HTTP requests, sends HTTP responses—but also verifies hardware token authentication.
The results show that Sentinel with hardware token authentication, but without hardware-
accelerated blacklisting, can handle the same attack rate as a standard web server. Therefore,
deploying Sentinel does not introduce performance degradation in the server farm and does
not open an additional venue for DDS attacks. I show in Section 6.7 that hardware accel-
erated blacklisting provides Sentinel with a significant performance gain over the standard
web server.
6.7 HTTP FLOOD ATTACKS AND BLACKLISTING
As shown in Section 6.6, DDoS attacks of 19,000 HTTP requests/second can deplete Sen-
tinel’s CPU resources. To improve its resilience to attacks, Sentinel can track the number of
requests without authentication credentials per client and blacklist the client as a bot after
a threshold of requests is exceeded. Sentinel drops packets from bot IP addresses on the
NFE I-8000 network acceleration card. This prevents bot traffic from consuming Sentinel’s
host CPU resources. I modified the experiment showing a DDoS attack at 19,000 HTTP re-
quests/second to show the advantages of hardware-accelerated blacklisting of bot-originated
traffic. For the new experiment, the legitimate client uses the wget test HTTP client [5] to
send HTTP requests once per second during the entire duration of the DDoS attack. To
send authenticated HTTP requests at this rate, I encoded a pre-generated, static hardware-
accelerated Kerberos proxy ticket as an HTTP cookie in all requests. Sentinel checks client
requests for the static Kerberos ticket and, if found, does not attempt to validate it. The
DDoS attack and the legitimate client requests last for 50 seconds. Sentinel blacklists client
IP addresses as bots after sending 32 consecutive HTTP requests without valid authentica-
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Figure 47: Experiment 6.7, 19000 cps – CPU utilization
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Figure 48: Experiment 6.7, 19000 cps – net-
work bandwidth
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Figure 49: Experiment 6.7, 19000 cps – re-
sponse time to get page
tion credentials.
Fig. 47 shows Sentinel’s CPU utilization during a DDoS attack of 19,000 HTTP request-
s/second before the attack, during the attack, and during blacklisting. The attack begins
ten seconds into the test and Sentinel’s CPU utilization spikes up to 97%. The attack uses
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Figure 50: Experiment 6.7, 24000 cps – CPU utilization
6,000 distinct IP addresses and the the bot requests are spread evenly between them, so each
request is used approximately 3.17 times per second. Therefore, it should take 10 seconds for
BoNeSi to generate 32 HTTP requests from each IP address. The results show that approx-
imately 10 seconds after the beginning of the attack, Sentinel starts blacklisting the bot IP
addresses and dropping bot-originated packets on the network acceleration card. Sentinel’s
CPU utilization drops to 3% and remains at that level until the end of the test. Fig. 48 shows
the network bandwidth consumed during the attack. The DDoS attack generates 193 Mbps
of traffic (also seen in Fig. 44). Once blacklisting starts, the HTTP flood attack is mostly
reduced to a SYN packet flood, because BoNeSi will never receive TCP SYN ACK packets
from Sentinel. A SYN flood attack of 19,000 SYN packets per second, where each SYN
packet Ethernet frame is 66 bytes, should generate 10.03 Mbps of traffic. The experiment
shows that the bandwidth consumed after blacklisting has started is 11 Mbps. Fig 49 shows
the response times of the legitimate client HTTP requests. The low response times match
the response times observed at 19,000 requests/second in Fig. 44.
When Sentinel using hardware token authentication without blacklisting was flooded with
more than 19,000 HTTP requests/second, the Sentinel application crashed and I was not
able to collect reliable performance data. I repeated the same experiment with blacklisting
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Figure 52: Experiment 6.7, 24000 cps – net-
work bandwidth
at 24,000 HTTP requests/second. Fig. 50 shows the CPU utilization before the attack,
during the peak of the attack and during blacklisting. The attack begins six seconds into the
experiment and Sentinel’s CPU utilization increases to nearly 100%. This can explain the
crash of the Sentinel application I observed during the experiment without blacklisting. At
24,000 request/second, it should take eight seconds for BoNesi to generate 32 requests from
each bot IP address. Because Sentinel could not keep up with the rate of the attack, it took
four seconds for BoNeSi to ramp up the attack. Sentinel starts blacklisting bot-originated
packets nine seconds after the beginning of the attack and Sentinel’s CPU utilization drops
to 1% until the end of the test. Fig. 52 shows the bandwidth consumed by the DDoS
attack. The generated traffic peaks to 220 Mbps at the height of the attack. A SYN flood
of 24,000 SYN packets/second, where each SYN packet Ethernet frame is 66 bytes, should
generate 12.67 Mbps of network traffic. The experiment shows that the network bandwidth
consumed after blacklisting has start is 14 Mbps. Fig. 51 shows the response times of the
legitimate client’s request during the experiment. The results show that the client response
time increases when the DDoS attack ramps up to its peak and then gradually decreases
when Sentinel starts blacklisting bot IP addresses and discarding bot-originated traffic.
Sentinel with hardware-accelerated blacklisting can scale to mitigate attacks of more than
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24,000 requests/second, but the rate of the attacks I can generate is limited by the CPU
resources of the attacker hosts in my performance setup. Once Sentinel has blacklisted all
bots and has inserted “reject” rules for all bot IP addresses in the NFE-I8000 card’s TCAM
table, the HTTP flood attack is reduced to a flood of SYN packets, which are dropped
on the NFE card. The NFE-I8000 is designed to handle up to 1Gbps of network traffic.
If a SYN packet Ethernet frame has a size of 90 bytes (32 bytes TCP header, 20 bytes
IP header, 14 bytes Ethernet header, and 24 bytes Ethernet CRC and inter-frame gap), it
would take approximately 1.4 million SYN packets per second to overload the NFE-I8000
card. Overloading the NFE-I8000 will also result in exhausting the 1GigE network links of
my performance setup. Sentinel is not designed to mitigate DDoS attacks where the attacker
can deplete the target’s network link capacity.
6.8 HTTPS FLOOD ATTACKS AGAINST WEB SERVERS
In this section, I measure the resilience of a standard web server against HTTPS flood
attacks. BoNeSi generates TLS Client Hello messages that force the TLS server to pick a
TLS cipher suite using ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange. In response of the
TLS Client Hello, the TLS server must generate a temporary (ephemeral) DH key pair, sign
the DH parameters and public key using its RSA private key and send the DH parameters,
DH public key and RSA signature inside the Server Key Exchange TLS message (Fig. 28).
For this experiment, the nginx web server runs on Sentinel’s hardware platform. Through
performance benchmark tests, I established that the hardware platform can generate up to
178 1024-bit DH key pairs/second or up to 469 1024-bit RSA signatures/second. Taking
the inverse of the rates, the host takes 5.618 milliseconds to generate a DH key pair and
2.132 milliseconds to produce an RSA signature. Because the web server has to do both
for each TLS connection, it will have to spend 7.75 milliseconds per TLS connection only
to execute public key cryptographic operations. This implies that the web server should
not be able to handle more than 129 TLS connections/second. The web server could offload
TLS handshake processing to cryptographic accelerators that can handle higher rates of TLS
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Figure 53: Experiment 6.8 – CPU utilization
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Figure 54: Experiment 6.8 – response time to
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Figure 55: Experiment 6.8 – network band-
width
connections. However, cryptographic accelerators do not verify client credentials in HTTP
requests. A botnet can still flood the target with HTTP requests inside the established TLS
tunnels.
Fig. 53 shows the web server’s CPU utilization under attack. At 132 TLS requests/sec-
ond, the web server’s CPU utilization reaches 95%. Increasing the attack rate further to
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140 TLS requests leaves the CPU utilization capped a 95%. The server is not able to keep
up with the attack rate and can not respond to all incoming TLS requests. Fig. 55 presents
the network bandwidth consumed by the attack. Due to the low attack rate, the amount of
generated traffic is negligible. This shows that application-level TLS floods can overwhelm
standard TLS servers with low volumes of custom TLS requests. Fig. 54 shows the response
time of the legitimate client’s requests during the attack. The results show high and very
variable response times after the server’s CPU utilization reaches 95%.
6.9 HTTPS FLOOD AND HARDWARE TOKEN AUTHENTICATION
This section tests Sentinel’s resilience to floods of TLS requests. Sentinel looks for valid
Kerberos credentials and in TLS Client Hello message and responds with a TLS fatal alert if
the credentials are not found. Sentinel can scale to higher-rate floods of TLS requests because
it does not execute any computationally intensive public key operations. If Sentinel finds
valid credentials in the Client Hello message, it passes it to the back-end web server, which
generates the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key and the RSA signature. The web server performs
these operations only for requests from clients that have demonstrated to be legitimate
human users.
Fig. 56 shows the CPU utilization under attack. Sentinel can mitigate TLS request
floods up to 36,000 requests/second. This is higher than the maximum of 19,000 HTTP
requests/second that Sentinel can handle because TLS Client Hello messages and alerts are
significantly smaller in size – 89 and 7 bytes, respectively. Fig. 57 presents the network
bandwidth consumed by the DDoS attack. At 36,000 TLS requests/second, the attack
generated 145Mbps of bi-directional network traffic. Fig. 58 and 59 show the legitimate
client’s response times to, respectively, get the pre-authentication challenge TLS alert and
download the web page after authenticating. At 39,000 requests/second, the response times
to download the web page peak at more than 10 seconds and become highly variable.
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Figure 56: Experiment 6.9 – CPU Utilization
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Figure 58: Experiment 6.9 – response time to
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7.0 SECURITY ANALYSIS
This chapter defines a threat model for the system architecture in this dissertation and
analyzes its security. I use the threat modeling techniques proposed in Myagmar et al. [108]
because they are suitable for modeling network systems composed of multiple components
with different roles. This threat modeling approach is related to the software application
threat modeling approach described in Swiderski, et al. [125], but is tailored to complex
network systems.
Section 7.1 characterizes the system’s components, interconnections and dependencies in
a network model. Section 7.2 identifies the system’s valuable assets and the access points
to those assets. Section 7.3 presents the threat profile of the system and the protection
mechanisms in place to mitigate the high-priority threats. Section 7.4 concludes this chapter.
7.1 NETWORK MODEL
Fig. 60 presents the network model of this dissertation’s system architecture. The model
consists of the following components:
 Client host:
– Web client application: requests web pages from a web server using the HTTP and
optionally TLS protocols.
– IdM client application: queries users for authentication credentials, makes function
calls into the Kerberos client library to obtain Kerberos AS-REQ messages, and
requests security tokens from an IdM identity provider using SOAP-based protocols
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Figure 60: Network model – dashed lines define trust domains.
over HTTP.
– Kerberos client library: receives user authentication credentials from IdM client and
generates AS-REQ requests for Kerberos proxy service tickets.
 Web server host:
– Web server application: listens for client HTTP and TLS connections on, respec-
tively, TCP ports 80 and 443, and serves requested web pages.
 Sentinel front-end device:
– Sentinel application: intercepts HTTP and TLS packets destined for the web server’s
TCP ports 80 and 443 and verifies Kerberos service tickets. If necessary, Sentinel
sends to the web client challenges for SecurID authentication using the HTTP or
TLS protocol.
 Authentication provider host:
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– IdM identity provider application: listens on TCP port 80 for security token requests
using SOAP-based protocols over HTTP and passes the AS-REQ from them to the
Kerberos KDC using the Kerberos protocol over TCP.
– Kerberos KDC application: listens on TCP port 88 for Kerberos AS-REQ requests
from the IdM identity provider, verifies the requests and passes usernames and RSA
SecurID token codes to the RSA SecurID authentication agent via library function
calls. Upon successful SecurID authentication, the KDC requests ticket-granting
and service tickets from the other Kerberos KDCs using the Kerberos protocol over
TCP.
– RSA SecurID authentication agent library: receives RSA SecurID usernames and
SecurID token codes from Kerberos KDC and passes them to the RSA Authentica-
tion Manager for verification using an unknown, proprietary network protocol over
UDP.
 Web server’s Kerberos KDC host:
– Kerberos KDC application: listens on TCP port 88 for Kerberos service ticket re-
quests, verifies ticket-granting tickets and issues service tickets granting access to the
web server.
 (optional) Intermediate Kerberos KDC hosts:
– Kerberos KDC application: listen on TCP port 88 for Kerberos ticket-granting ticket
requests, verify the ticket-granting tickets in the requests, and issue new ticket-
granting tickets.
 RSA authentication manager host:
– RSA Authentication Manager application: listens on UDP port 5500 for SecurID au-
thentication requests from the SecurID authentication agent and checks the SecurID
credentials against an internal database.
7.1.1 USAGE SCENARIO
In a typical usage scenario, the web client wishes to communicate over HTTP or TLS with
the web server. The Sentinel transparent front-end device intercepts the client’s HTTP or
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TLS requests and challenges the client to authenticate using an RSA SecurID. The web
client invokes the IdM client application. The IdM client queries the user for their RSA
SecurID token code and Kerberos password, generates a Kerberos AS-REQ request for a
hardware-authenticated Kerberos proxy ticket, encodes the AS-REQ into an IdM security
token request and sends the request in a SOAP message over HTTP to the IdM identity
provider. The identity provider extracts the AS-REQ message and passes it to the client’s
Kerberos KDC. The KDC extracts the SecurID token code from the AS-REQ and passes it
to the RSA authentication agent library, which sends it to the RSA authentication manager
for verification. Upon successful SecurID authentication, the client’s KDC obtains ticket-
granting tickets from all intermediate Kerberos KDCs, if any, obtains a service ticket for the
web server from the server’s Kerberos KDC and returns the service ticket to the IdM identity
provider. The identity provider encodes the ticket into a security token and returns it to
the IdM client, which extracts the Kerberos ticket and stores into the web client’s HTTP
cookie database. The web client sends the Kerberos ticket with subsequent HTTP and TLS
requests to the web server.
7.1.2 TRUST DOMAINS AND DEPENDENCIES
The authentication path between the web client and Sentinel contains a series of trust do-
mains and dependencies. Each Kerberos realm and its KDC are typically located in a
separate trust domain. For example, the Kerberos client and its KDC form a trust domain.
The client is registered as a principal on the client’s KDC. The two share a cryptographic
key derived from the client’s Kerberos password and use the key to encrypt and authenticate
each other’s messages. System administrators can explicitly configure two KDCs to trust
each other and thus bridge two trust domains. A shared key is exchanged out-of-band when
the trust relationship is established. Sentinel, Sentinel’s KDC and the web server also form
a trust domain. Sentinel is registered as a server principal in the KDC and the two also
share a cryptographic key exchanged out-of-band.
Authentication paths with multiple hops form a series of dependencies and trust links
between Kerberos realms. Trust in inter-realm Kerberos authentication is not transitive
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because each KDC must be explicitly configured to trust both adjacent and non-adjacent
KDCs on the authentication path. Non-transitive trust is important because each KDC
relies on all upstream KDCs before it to have correctly authenticated the Kerberos client. A
single malicious KDC can compromise the security of Kerberos by issuing a ticket-granting
ticket without properly authenticating the client. The Kerberos protocol allows KDCs to be
configured with explicit lists of trusted realm KDCs. All Kerberos tickets have a “transited-
realms” field that records the list of realms traversed on the authentication path so far. If
a list of explicitly trusted realms is configured, the KDC must check the “transited-realms”
field against the list and reject the ticket-granting ticket request if any of the KDCs traversed
are not explicitly trusted. If the KDC trusts all upstream KDCs, it copies the “transited-
realms“ field from the existing ticket-granting ticket into the newly issued ticket and appends
the upstream KDC to the list.
The RSA authentication agent and manager also form a trust domain overseen by the
client’s authentication provider, which offers RSA SecurID authentication as a service. Each
authentication agent is registered in the manager and the manager generates a binary con-
figuration file for the new agent. The format of the binary file are proprietary and unknown,
but includes the IP address and port number of the authentication manager. The binary
configuration file is used during the authentication agent installation. When the agent con-
tacts the manager for the first time, the manager passes to the agent a “node secret”, which
is a symmetric encryption key. The type and format of the node secret, as well as the
mechanism for generating and passing the node secret onto an agent, is proprietary and not
publicly known. The authentication manager and agent communicate over a proprietary
UDP protocol. Future agent-manager communication is encrypted with the node secret.
The client KDC and, ultimately, Sentinel depend on the RSA Authentication Manager
to authenticate clients. The authentication manager must verify that the client’s token code
is correct within an admissible time range and must check or token revocation. Failure to
do so may make it more feasible for a bot to authenticate to Sentinel as a human user.
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7.2 SYSTEM ASSETS AND ACCESS POINTS
I identified the following assets an attacker may target and their access points:
 Kerberos user passwords, obtained by key stroke capturing malware, bruce-force attacks
or social engineering
 Kerberos AS-REQ requests, sniffed from the network
 Kerberos proxy service tickets, sniffed from the network, or read from web client HTTP
cookie store
 Kerberos shared keys, accessed from the KDC or Sentinel filesystem
 RSA SecurID tokens, stolen from the client
 RSA SecurID token seeds, stolen from the client or a central database
 RSA SecurID token codes, stolen from the client as they become available
 RSA SecurID PRNG algorithm, deduced through reverse engineering
 RSA authentication manager CPU capacity, depleted by a large volume of requests
 Kerberos KDC CPU capacity, depleted by a large volume of requests
 Sentinel CPU capacity, depleted by a large volume of requests
 Sentinel TCAM memory capacity, depleted by having to blacklist a large number of bots
7.3 THREAT PROFILE
Below is the list of threats an attacker may use to attack the system assets listed in Section
7.2. For each threat, I discuss existing and possible mitigation mechanisms.
7.3.1 REPLAYING STOLEN KERBEROS PROXY SERVICE TICKETS
Web clients obtain Kerberos proxy service tickets after successful hardware token pre-authentication,
store them in HTTP cookie databases, and pass them to web servers in subsequent HTTP
requests and TLS Client Hello messages. Kerberos tickets are encrypted with a Kerberos
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shared key, but attackers may steal the encrypted ticket and bypass hardware token authen-
tication to flood the web server with HTTP or TLS requests.
Attackers have multiple points of access for stealing Kerberos proxy service tickets. Major
web clients, such as Mozilla Firefox, store the HTTP cookie table unprotected on the client’s
hard disk. An attacker with access to a client host can continuously monitor the HTTP
cookie table and obtain the Kerberos credentials stored in it. The attacker can also use a
malicious browser extension to intercept Kerberos credentials returned by the IdM client. If
the attacker has access to the client’s network interfaces, they can also sniff the proxy service
tickets in the security token response from the IdM provider, or in the HTTP requests and
TLS Client Hello messages to the web server.
This dissertation work mitigates the threat of replaying Kerberos credentials by binding
Kerberos service ticket to a client’s IP address, using SYN cookies on Sentinel to prevent
IP spoofing, and limiting the number of HTTP requests a client can send with a Kerberos
service ticket. The Kerberos protocol allows tickets to be bound to client IP addresses. The
client KDC in the proposed architecture uses this feature to bind the proxy service ticket
to the IP address of the client that requested it. An attacker may bypass this defense by
stealing the Kerberos credentials and spoofing the source IP address for the HTTP/TLS
request flood to be the client’s IP address. To address this, the Sentinel front-end device
intercepts client TCP SYN packets and uses SYN cookies to ensure that the client’s IP
address is not spoofed.
An attacker with access to the client’s computer may bypass the defense mechanisms
above by generating the HTTP/TLS flood from the client’s computer. This attack mimics a
legitimate flash crowd and Sentinel cannot distinguish between the legitimate client and the
bot requests. Sentinel mitigates this attack by limiting the number of HTTP/TLS requests a
client or bot can send with a valid Kerberos credential. The current Sentinel implementation
sets the limit to four requests per credential, but the parameter can be adjusted higher to
fit the needs of users accessing complex web sites with tens or even hundreds of objects on a
single web page. Assuming that the legitimate client has a single SecurID token and given
that the SecurID token outputs a new token code every 60 seconds, an attacker controlling a
legitimate client’s computer is rate-limited in the number of malicious HTTP/TLS requests
94
they can generate per minute from a compromised client computer. Future work can extend
the system architecture to temporarily revoke the SecurID tokens of clients, who obtain
authenticate very often and obtain excessive number of Kerberos service tickets.
7.3.2 KERBEROS PASSWORD AND RSA SECURID TOKEN CODE THEFT
An attacker may compromise a user’s Kerberos password as a first step towards obtaining
a Kerberos proxy service ticket from the name of the client. Compromising the password
may allow the attacker to obtain a single token code if they can intercept the Kerberos
client’s AS-REQ request to the client’s KDC. The AS-REQ message is encrypted with a
key derived from the user’s password and contains a SecurID token code. If the attacker
extracts the token code, they can generate a new AS-REQ message and send it to the client’s
KDC to obtain a new proxy service ticket. The attacker may also compromise the user’s
computer and install malware that steals Kerberos passwords and RSA SecurID token codes
by capturing keyboard key strokes.
Both attacks allow the attacker to continuously obtain service tickets and use them to
send floods of HTTP/TLS requests to the web server. The system architecture proposed
mitigates this attack by limiting the number of HTTP/TLS requests and client can send with
a Kerberos proxy service ticket. The rate at which the attacker can obtain service tickets is
also limited to the rate at which the user’s SecurID token generates new token codes (once
a minute).
7.3.3 RSA SECURID TOKEN AND TOKEN SEED THEFT
An attacker may steal legitimate users’ RSA SecurID tokens and use the token codes from
them to obtain Kerberos proxy service tickets and send a flood of HTTP/TLS requests to the
web server. This attack is impractical due to the number of hardware tokens registered with
the RSA Authentication Manager that the attacker must steal to generate a sufficiently large
flood of requests. The RSA Authentication Manager allows revoking lost or stolen hardware
tokens, thus limiting the time window available for the attack. This dissertation’s system
architecture mitigates the attack by requiring the attacker to also know the Kerberos user’s
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password. Without knowledge of the password, it is infeasible for the attacker to generate a
valid AS-REQ request for the client’s KDC.
The SecurID token seed is a secret AES key used to generate new token codes. In
a recent attack against RSA, attackers may have stolen mappings between SecurID serial
numbers and token codes [74]. The RSA SecurID token code generation algorithm is not
publicly known, but is allegedly known to RSA partners and there have been attempts to
reverse engineer and analyze it [84, 15, 107]. The algorithm allegedly combines the current
time and the token’s secret seed key to generate a new token code. If an attacker knows
both the code generation algorithm and the secret token seed, they can likely predict future
token codes. This attack is similar to the SecurID token theft attack and is mitigated in
a similar way. Token codes become valid on at the time when a SecurID hardware token
would generate them. If an attacker can guess multiple token codes prior to the time they
will be displayed on the token’s LCD screen, the attacker must still wait for the codes to
become valid. This rate-limits the number of malicious HTTP/TLS requests the attacker
can generate per compromised SecurID token seed. If the attacker compromises a large
database of SecurID token seeds, they still need the respective users’ Kerberos passwords to
successfully execute the attack.
7.3.4 AVAILABILITY OF RSA AUTHENTICATION MANAGER
The ability of the client to access the web server depends on the availability of the RSA
Authentication Manager application. The authentication manager is provided as a service
by the user’s identity provider and verifies token codes of RSA SecurID tokens issued by
the provider. An attacker could make the manager unavailable by overloading it with au-
thentication requests. The manager requires all authentication agents authorized to contact
this server to be explicitly registered by agent IP address. Therefore, an attacker must use
spoofed client IP addresses. The authentication manager is run on general purpose operating
systems, such as Windows Server and Red Hat Enterprise Linux. Enabling TCP SYN cookies
in the operating system kernel would prevent attackers from using IP spoofing. The internal
architecture of the authentication manager and the network protocol used are not publicly
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known. Therefore, it is infeasible to analyze in detail the resilience of the authentication
manager to DDoS attacks.
7.3.5 AVAILABILITY OF KERBEROS KDCS
The ability of the client to access the web server also depends on the availability of the
Kerberos KDCs. AS-REQ messages and ticket-granting ticket requests contain encrypted
portions that the KDC must decrypt before it verifies the authenticity of the request. An
attacker could cause the Kerberos KDC to decrypt a flood of fake requests and deplete its
CPU cycles. The Kerberos protocol provides a limited resilience to DDoS attacks because
allows using efficient symmetric encryption algorithms, such as AES, to encrypt and decrypt
Kerberos requests. Kerberos KDC have better ability than general purpose web servers to
filter out DDoS traffic. General-purpose web servers often have large and constantly changing
pools of users. KDCs typically only need to be accessible by Kerberos clients registered with
the KDC as part of the Kerberos realm. Filtering rules configured in the KDC’s operating
system network stack, such as iptables rules, or in external firewalls can discard traffic from
client IP addresses that are not registered in the Kerberos realm. This will not prevent
new clients from registering in the realm because new user registration is typically done
offline. I assume that KDCs verify users before registering them in the domain. It should
be infeasible for a botmaster to register enough client IP addresses to be able to flood the
KDC with Kerberos authentication requests. Filtering rules can optionally be inserted only
when the Kerberos host’s CPU utilization rises above a critical threshold.
7.3.6 DEPLETING SENTINEL’S TCAM MEMORY CAPACITY
Sentinel uses the TCAM memory on its network acceleration card to blacklist client IP
addresses identified as bots. A large botnet may have more bots than Sentinel can blacklist
given its TCAM memory capacity. The TCAM table of the NFE-i8000 network acceleration
card currently used in Sentinel has space for up to 32,768 filtering rules for blacklisted IP
addresses. As explained in the system model in Section 2.1, this dissertation considers
botnets of up to 220,000 bots. In order to prevent botnets of this size from depleting
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Sentinel’s TCAM memory capacity, Sentinel can deploy the newer-generation NFP-32400
network acceleration card, which has expanded TCAM memory and can fit up to 262,144
filtering rules. Sentinel can also specify IP address subnets in the filtering rule keys. Such
rules can match more than one IP address with a single rule and can reduce the number
of filtering rules Sentinel must store in its TCAM memory. However, subnet blocking can
result in false positives, where legitimate clients on the same subnet as bots are identified
and blacklisted as bots. Sentinel alleviates this problem by periodically rehabilitating all
blacklisted IP addresses. This is only a temporary resolution because legitimate clients that
were once incorrectly identified as bots are likely to be blacklisted again as long as their IP
subnet remains houses a large number of bots. Therefore, IP subnet blocking should only be
used when the circumstances do not allow deploying a network acceleration card with large
enough TCAM memory.
7.4 CONCLUSION
Instead of flooding Sentinel with HTTP and TLS requests to deplete its CPU resources,
a botmaster may choose different means to attack Sentinel and the web server behind it.
This chapter has explored multiple alternative attacks: stealing credentials or token codes
to authenticate bot traffic to the web server, attacking the availability of the authentication
provider, and depleting the capacity of Sentinel’s table of blacklisted IP addresses. The anal-
ysis in this chapter has argued that the system architecture proposed in this dissertation can
defend against the attacks considered, supporting the claim that the system can effectively
mitigate botnet-based HTTP and TLS floods against web servers.
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8.0 RELATED WORK AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Existing work in literature has proposed solutions to a subset of the problems addressed in
this dissertation. Section 8.1 and 8.2 present CAPTCHA puzzles and trusted computing as
mechanisms to distinguish legitimate client activity from bot traffic. Different proposals exist
to mitigate application-level DDoS attacks by using indirection to obfuscate the location and
identities of active servers. Section 8.3 discusses WebSOS, which routes web requests through
a secure overlay of redundant network paths to prevent link congestion attacks. Section 8.4
discusses the usage of proactive roaming honeypots to obfuscate the location of backend
servers. Extensive work exists on using client puzzles to redistribute the computational load
of the TLS protocol from servers to clients and make it hard for attackers to cripple TLS
servers with CPU-intensive requests. An overview of this work is provided in Section 8.5.
Section 8.6 presents commercial solutions to detect and mitigate application level DDoS
attacks. The design of the system proposed in this dissertation is a result of a number of
design choices. Section 8.7 compares the choices made to alternative approaches to solve the
problems addressed in the dissertation.
8.1 CAPTCHAS
Researchers have proposed client authentication with CAPTCHA (Completely Automated
Public Turing Test To Tell Computers and Humans Apart) graphical puzzles [131] to distin-
guish between traffic from human clients and bots. Web sites use CAPTCHAs to prevent
automated spam-related activity, such as e-mail account creation and online forum posts.
The images are generated using distortion techniques (Fig. 61) to resist automated object
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recognition techniques [105]. Other CAPTCHAs present the clients with graphical image,
audio, or video puzzles [117].
Figure 61: Sample CAPTCHA visual test designs
Existing CAPTCHAs are vulnerable to machine learning attacks [52, 41] and there are
multiple commercially available CAPTCHA crackers on the market [123]. In 2002, re-
searchers reported a mechanism with 92% success rate of breaking Yahoo CAPTCHAs [105].
Yahoo subsequently improved its CAPTCHAs, but more recent reports suggest successful
attacks against Yahoo [58], Windows Live [90], Google [69] and other CAPTCHAs [52].
CAPTCHA authentication is also vulnerable to DDoS attacks. Servers cannot reuse
CAPTCHAs because an attacker can solve a puzzle and replay the stored answer when the
puzzle is reused. Assuming limited server storage space, single-use puzzles require servers to
generate new CAPTCHA images at the same rate as client request rates. A bot master can
exploit this using DDoS attacks with a high rate of CAPTCHA requests.
reCAPTCHA [12] allows web servers to offload CAPTCHA generation and verification
to dedicated CAPTCHA servers (Fig. 62). The client requests a page and the web server re-
sponds. The response instructs the client to obtain a puzzle from a reCAPTCHA server. The
user solves the puzzle and returns the answer to the web server, which asks the reCAPTCHA
server to verify it.
reCAPTCHA addresses attacks where an attacker publishes reCAPTCHA puzzles on
the attacker’s own web sites. Legitimate users solve the puzzles and the attacker uses the
responses to authenticate. reCAPTCHA generates a public/private key pair for each web
server domain. The private key is not assumed to be secure and is only used to tie puzzle
answers to the CAPTCHA puzzles they solve. The web server sends its reCAPTCHA public
key to the client, which uses it to request a puzzle. The reCAPTCHA server matches the
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Figure 62: Message exchange using reCAPTCHA
domain name in the client request’s HTTP Referrer field with the domain name for the public
key. The client solves the puzzle and sends the solution to the web server. To verify the result,
the web server sends it along with its reCAPTCHA private key to the reCAPTCHA server.
The reCAPTCHA server verifies that the private key matches the web server’s domain name
and that the puzzle was issued for the corresponding public key. The client and web server
may use a TLS connection to communicate with the reCAPTCHA server.
reCAPTCHA uses scanned book text, so its graphic puzzles represent common dictio-
nary words and names. The lack of randomness makes reCAPTCHA puzzles vulnerable to
attacks using packet shaping and artificial intelligence techniques [41]. reCAPTCHA is also
vulnerable to DDoS attacks. It limits the puzzle request rate per client, but a large botnet
can exhaust the reCAPTCHA server CPU resources using only a few CAPTCHA requests
per bot.
Web servers cannot restrict the set of users that can solve a CAPTCHA. When a client
host (or a bot) sends a web request and receives back a puzzle, the client can forward the
puzzle to an unintended user on another client host to solve. Botmasters, who control adult
web sites, lure human users to solve CAPTCHAs before accessing restricted content [96].
When the users want to access a video or a photo, they are asked to solve a CAPTCHA.
The CAPTCHA displayed is from another website that the botmaster wants to attack. In a
similar fashion, botmasters could also hijack other web browsing sessions to present the user
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with CAPTCHAs to solve [68]. A botmaster can also forward puzzles to commercial online
CAPTCHA-solving services [42, 106]. Such services hire third party human solvers to solve
hundreds of thousands of CAPTCHAs per day for as little as $1 per 1000 puzzles [82].
iCAPTCHAs aim to defend against third-party human solvers by presenting users with
multiple puzzles with varying timeouts [126]. The iCAPTCHA solution uses a training pe-
riod, during which it presents users with single character CAPTCHAs and measures the time
users take to solve them. After the training period is over, iCAPTCHA uses the information
gathered to set limits on the time users have to solve real CAPTCHAs. An attacker must
receive the puzzle, forward it to a third-party human solver, receive the response and send
it to iCAPTCHA before the puzzle timeout expires. The authors claim that the roundtrip
communication latency makes it infeasible for the attacker to return the puzzle answer on
time. iCAPTCHAs are vulnerable to attacks where attackers have human solvers standing
by to solve CAPTCHAs in real time. They are also vulnerable to artificial intelligence attacks
because they use the same format for single-character training puzzles and real puzzles.
8.1.1 KILL-BOTS
The Kill-Bots system [87] uses CAPTCHA authentication to mitigate bot-based DDoS at-
tacks against web servers. It intercepts incoming HTTP requests and challenges clients to
authenticate using CAPTCHA puzzles. If a client exceeds a threshold of issued puzzles
without a correct answer, Kill-Bots blacklists it as a bot and blocks further traffic from its
IP address.
Kill-Bots does not support HTTP 1.1 features, such as persistent connections and pipelin-
ing, because it implicitly assumes that each HTTP request uses a separate TCP connection.
An attacker can pipeline multiple HTTP 1.1 requests in the same TCP connection to evade
the CAPTCHA authentication requirement. Kill-Bots also does not protect secure servers
using HTTPS.
Kill-Bots drops requests from blacklisted IP addresses even after malicious clients stopped
using them. A different proposal by Mehra et al. [102] blocks the IP address for a period of
time after three unsuccessful attempts. It also uses a variety of CAPTCHAs including image-
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based, text-based, vector-based and geometry-based CAPTCHAs. However, both Mehra et
al. and Kill-Bots implicitly assume that attackers do not maliciously fragment packets or
spoof fields other than the IP address. A single IP address can identify both legitimate
clients and bots if they are behind the same HTTP proxy or NAT router.
8.2 TRUSTED COMPUTING
Not-a-Bot [76] and Jamshed et al. [83] use trusted computing and Trusted Platform Modules
(TPMs) to distinguish legitimate client activity from bot traffic. TPMs are small crypto-
graphic co-processors commonly found in contemporary general-purpose laptop and desktop
computers that provide secure key storage and implement a limited set of cryptographic
operations in hardware. In Not-a-Bot, the TPM is used to bootstrap a trusted human ac-
tivity attester application that monitors the mouse and keyboard activity to detect human
presence at the client host. The attester executes inside a Xen hypervisor, which protects
the attester from the client’s untrusted operating system. When a user requests a web page,
the browser requests an attestation from the human activity attester. The attester deduces
human presence at the client host by verifying the existence of recent keyboard and mouse
activity. If it verifies human presence, the attester generates an attestation containing the
secure hashes of the attester executable, the Xen hypervisor, the system BIOS and the web
URL requested by the client. The attester signs the attestation with a private attestation
signing key sealed into the client’s TPM and only released to the trusted attester applica-
tion. The attestation signing public/private key pair is derived by an attestation identify
key permanently stored in the TPM. The TPM uses the attestation identity private key to
issue a certificate for the attester’s attestation signing public key.
The web client sends the signed attestation and the attestation signing public key cer-
tificate along with the HTTP request. The web server receives the request, verifies the
attestation public key certificate and uses the public key to verify the attestation signature.
The web server verifies that the web URL in the attestation matches the URL for the re-
source requested by the client and scans the list of software hashes in the attestation to
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verify that it trusts the attester application, Xen hypervisor and BIOS firmware running on
the client host.
The Not-a-Bot authors admit that their system is vulnerable to smart attacks, where
a bot executable can trigger human activity on the client host and fool the attester into
providing the bot with a human presence attestation. Not-a-Bot does not defend from the
more general scenario where a human user is using the keyboard and mouse while the bot is
sending malicious requests to the web server. Jamshed et al. [83] addresses this weakness in
Not-a-Bot by tightly binding the keyboard activity to the content requested from the web
server.
Verifying attestation places a significant burden on the web server. The server must
obtain and verify a certificate for the client TPM’s attestation identity public key before it
can use the public key to verify the attestation signing public key certificate. The attestation
identify public key certificate must be issued by a well-known certifying authority trusted by
the web server. Only then the server can trust the attestation signing public key to verify the
attestation signature. The web server then must examine the list of hashes in the attestation
and verify that the client host is running trusted versions of the attester application, Xen
hypervisor and BIOS firmware. Verifying the trustworthiness of the software running on a
remote host is a challenging problem in trusted computing because the server, or a third
party, must maintain lists of known software vulnerabilities and new releases.
The system proposed in this dissertation does not require the modification of web servers
because the web server farm behind Sentinel is unaware of Sentinel and the Kerberos fed-
erated authentication architecture. Not-a-Bot could also use unmodified web servers by of-
floading the verification of client attestation to a dedicated front-end device, but the problem
with verifying the trustworthiness of the client’s software remains. A malicious or compro-
mised attester application can generate attestations without verifying human presence and
send malicious requests to the web server. In comparison, Chapter 7 shows that Sentinel
assumes untrusted software running on the client host. An attacker can continuously steal
SecurID token codes or Kerberos service tickets from the client host, but would not be able
to use them to generate DDoS attacks against the web server.
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8.3 SECURE OVERLAYS
WebSOS [104] addresses link congestion DDoS attacks against web servers. It authenticates
clients with CAPTCHA puzzles and eliminates “pinch points” by routing authenticated
requests through a secure overlay of redundant network paths. Overlay nodes may have the
following roles:
 Each web server periodically picks a number of secret servlets authorized to forward
traffic to it. The web server notifies firewalls deployed deep in the wide area network to
drop all packets that did not pass through one of the newly chosen secret servlets. The
identities of the servlets are secret to clients.
 When assigned to a server, each servlet selects a small number of beacon nodes and
notifies them of its identity and the web server it protects. The beacon nodes then
route traffic destined for the server through the servlet. The dynamically changing set
of beacons and secret servlets provides redundant paths to the web server and makes it
harder for an attacker to identify and congest critical links.
 Any node in the overlay can act as a Secure Overlay Access Point (SOAP). Access points
authenticate client requests CAPTCHA puzzles and route them through the overlay to
a beacon node. Authenticated clients receive short-lived X.509 client certificates that
allow them to access the web server multiple times without re-authenticating.
WebSOS requires significant network modifications to deploy. The secure overlay is
spread over a geographically distributed network, such as the Internet, that spans multiple
administrative domains. The firewalls that discard server-bound traffic that has not passed
through a secret servlet must be deployed deep into the wide area network, typically inside the
web server’s ISP, to keep malicious traffic away from the server’s network. The secure overlay
cannot easily be deployed incrementally because WebSOS assumes a low ratio between secret
servlets and other overlay nodes to make it hard for an attacker to guess the identities of the
current secret servlets. WebSOS assumes that overlay nodes communicate with each other
using SSL tunnels to protect the confidentiality of the server-to-servlet and servlet-to-beacon
messages that can reveal the servlet’s identities. To further defend against guessing attacks,
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WebSOS assumes that the secret servlets can modify packet header fields to mark legitimate
traffic.
WebSOS does not handle attacks against CAPTCHA authentication using third-party
solvers. A botmaster can use hired solvers to solve CAPTCHA puzzles and pass them to
the bots, which authenticate with WebSOS access points, receive short-lived X.509 client
certificates and flood the web server with requests until the certificate expires.
WebSOS aims to solve the problem of link congestion DDoS attacks, which are outside the
intended scope of this dissertation. To eliminate pinch points and keep malicious traffic away
from the web server’s network, WebSOS requires significant network modifications to deploy
a large enough secure overlay. In comparison, the system proposed in this dissertation aims
to mitigate application-level DDoS attacks that deplete the target’s CPU resources and takes
a more end-to-end approach [120] that does not require significant network modifications.
This dissertation’s system model assumes that malicious traffic can reach the server network,
where it is identified and discarded by the Sentinel front end device.
WebSOS verifies the human identify of clients using CAPTCHA authentication, but
does not address attacks that use third-party human CAPTCHA solvers. A botnet can use
hired solvers to solve CAPTCHA puzzles, obtain short-lived client certificates from WebSOS
and flood the web server with requests until the client certificates expire. WebSOS cannot
use hardware token authentication instead of CAPTCHA puzzles because it assumes that
all overlay nodes, potentially located in different administrative domains, can act as access
points and authenticate clients. WebSOS does not use federated authentication to delegate
the authentication responsibility to independent authentication providers.
WebSOS assumes that client-server communication is encrypted end-to-end inside SSL
tunnels through a series of overlay nodes that act as web proxies. The mandatory use of SSL
introduces performance and administrative overhead on web servers. Web clients must be
pre-configured to proxy web requests through one or more WebSOS access points. WebSOS
also requires a Java applet to be installed in client browsers. In comparison, the system
in this dissertation only requires a client browser extension that acts as a Kerberos client.
Client requests need not be proxied and need not be tunneled inside SSL.
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8.4 ROAMING HONEYPOTS
Khattab et al. [91] introduces the usage of roaming honeypots, an architecture where the
backend servers in a server farm proactively switch between being active servers and honey-
pots. The new set of active servers is determined at pre-generated, pseudo-random intervals
of time known to both the server farm and legitimate clients, but not to attackers. Servers
not actively providing service act as honeypots and track and blacklists attackers trying to
guess the current set of active servers.
Legitimate clients obtain the schedule of active servers by subscribing to receive service
from an overlay of access gateways, which act as server front-ends. They authenticate clients,
authorize their requests, and route the requests to the pool of active backend servers. The
authors do not specify how access gateways authenticate and authorize client requests. In
comparison, the system proposed in this dissertation authenticates the human identities of
clients using hardware token authentication in a federated setting.
The overlay of access gateways is assumed to be large, geographically dispersed and
continuously adapting to attacks. The system model places the gateways in close proximity
to clients to avoid extra latency for client requests. The solution described in this dissertation
does not require the addition of network hosts outside the server farm network. In this
proposal, the Sentinel front-end device is transparent to both clients and servers. Web
servers can be used without any software modifications and need not act as honeypots.
8.5 CLIENT PUZZLES
Researchers have proposed challenging clients with network-based or computationally hard
client puzzles. Network-based puzzles, such as proposed in Abliz et al. [37], introduces
network latency to throttle the rate of DDoS attacks. Computational puzzles, also known as
proof-of-work, to discourage clients from sending frivolous requests. Client puzzles are based
on different intractable or moderately hard problems [119, 67, 88, 85] and require clients
to perform computational work before sending a request. Stebila et al. [124] increase the
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complexity of the client puzzles to decrease the frequency of requests from a single attacker.
Morein et al. [103] uses client puzzles to redistribute the load of TLS connections from servers
to clients. While client puzzles make harder DDoS attacks from a small number of attacking
nodes, botnets have the computational resources to solve puzzles at high rates.
Juels and Brainard [86] propose thwarting TCP SYN flooding attacks [57] with client
puzzles composed of independent sub-puzzles. A botnet can defeat this scheme by solving
subpuzzles on different bots in parallel. Rivest et al. [119] and Dean at. al. [61] propose
computational puzzles with dependent subparts, such as repeated modular exponentiation
where the output of step i is the input for step i+ 1. A botmaster, however, can command
sufficient number of attacking nodes and generate a large attack using only a few connection
requests per node.
A web server must generate or acquire new client puzzles at sufficient rates to meet client
demand, but puzzle generation can become a target of DDoS attacks. Lakshminarayanan et
al. [97] and Waters et al. [134] propose to offload the computation to a dedicated external
node. However, offloading the computation can make the dedicated external nodes targets
of DDoS attacks.
Bocan [47] proposes threshold puzzles, which enforce lower and upper bounds on the
latency of puzzles solutions. This work, however, does not specify ways to reliably estab-
lish such bounds in the presence of variable network round-trip times or client hardware
configurations with different amount of computational power. Moreover, a botmaster can
artificially delay puzzle responses to avoid detection.
Wang and Reiter [133] introduce puzzle auctions, where legitimate clients and attackers
can choose the difficulty of the puzzles they solve. Hosts that solved more difficult puzzles
are serviced with higher priority when the server is under an attack. Legitimate clients can
outbid attackers by gradually increasing the difficulty of the puzzles they solve until receiving
service. However, clients may have to solve a possibly unbounded number of puzzles before
receiving service, and thus may experience high delays. This approach may also engage
clients in “bidding wars” against botnets with greater hardware resources.
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8.6 COMMERCIAL APPLICATION LEVEL DDOS SOLUTIONS
With the rise of application level DDoS attacks, a number of commercial systems to detect
and mitigate such attacks have been offered commercially. The information presented here
is compiled from marketing whitepapers and other publicly available documentation.
The BIG-IP Application Security Manager (ASM) by F5 networks [3] is a security appli-
ance that detects and mitigates Layer 7 DDoS attacks, including HTTP floods. This solution
has a learning period, during which it gathers information about the normal usage of the
protected web application. The information collected may include access rate, response la-
tency, rate of HTTP error page responses and geographical location of legitimate users. It
may also include information about legitimate traffic peaks, such as Monday morning or
payday peaks in traffic. After the learning phase, the ASM treats irregularly high traffic
patterns as suspected DDoS attacks. Once a DDoS attack is detected, the ASM attempts to
distinguish legitimate clients from automated bots by inserting a custom JavaScript snippet
into application responses. Legitimate clients using web browsers execute the JavaScript
snippet and pass the tests, but bots using automated traffic generation tools do not. The
system then mitigates the DDoS attack by introducing access delays for or dropping the
connections of suspicious clients.
The JavaScript snippets used by the ASM solution identify automated DDoS generation
tools instead of verifying the human nature of web users. The information publicly available
from F5 does not reveal details about the snippet. It may be effective in detecting automated
bots running basic tools, but will likely fail against more sophisticated tools that use a
JavaScript engine to respond to challenges. The snippets may be computationally intensive
and resemble client puzzles, but a large botnet has the computational resources to respond
to challenges at high rates. In comparison, the system proposed in this dissertation filters
out automated bots by verifying the human nature of legitimate users. It is infeasible for an
attacker to use automated bots to respond to authentication challenges.
The Peakflow SP Threat Management System (TMS) [6] from Arbor Networks also
provides mitigation of application-level DDoS attacks. The TMS appliance is based on
the Peakflow SP [1], which is a security-oriented, network-wide traffic monitoring system.
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The Peakflow SP detects application-level DDoS attacks and routes the requests through
a TMS appliance where they are analyzed in greater depth. The TMS appliance can be
deployed inline and intercept incoming traffic, or it can advertise a BGP route to cause the
attack traffic to be rerouted through the appliance. A network operator can mitigate the
DDoS attack by blocking or rate-limitting HTTP requests based on destination URL, source
geolocation, or another traffic attribute.
The Arbor Networks PeakFlow solution is deployed throughout a server or ISP network
and detects DDoS attacks by monitoring network traffic. Once it has identified an attack,
it does not attempt to distinguish between legitimate clients and attackers, but rate limits
or blocks traffic based on traffic attributes. The solution I propose in this dissertation is
more fine-grained and less intrusive than PeakFlow. The system only requires deploying
the transparent Sentinel front end device in the server farm network and does not require
any other network infrastructure. I propose to distinguish between legitimate clients and
attackers using hardware token authentication and discard only the attackers’ traffic without
affecting the performance of legitimate client requests.
8.7 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
This section describes some of the design choices made when designing Sentinel and com-
pares them to some of the alternative approaches that could have been taken. The Sentinel
front-end device is a vital component of the system. Sentinel performs some of the same
functionality as existing stateful application-level firewalls [3]: packet scrubbing, stateful
packet filtering, deep packet inspection, and discarding packets from malicious hosts. How-
ever, Sentinel cannot be replaced with an application-level firewall because Sentinel checks
for hardware-accelerated Kerberos credentials and responds with authentication challenges
to unauthenticated requests. Sentinel can be integrated into a future firewall product, but
existing firewall products currently do not provide this functionality. Without Sentinel in
place to send authentication challenges, web clients would have to know to explicitly authen-
ticate in advance and obtain hardware-authenticated Kerberos credentials before accessing
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the web server.
Continuously checking for authentication credentials also enables Sentinel to identify
clients as bots, blacklist them, and discard bot traffic in hardware. Application-level fire-
walls typically blacklist clients based on anomalies in client traffic, such as zero-length TCP
windows [29]. Sentinel monitors the load on the web servers behind it to decide when to
require client authentication and when it can pass unauthenticated requests through to the
web server farm. Sentinel also periodically rehabilitates blacklisted IP addresses.
Another alternative approach to the Sentinel front-end device is to replace it with a
number of web server hosts. The web server farm can either attempt to withstand the
DDoS attack by having a large enough number of servers, or it can implement Sentinel’s
functionality on the web servers. In the former scenario, web servers must check HTTP
and TLS requests for authentication. The performance results in Section 6.6 show that
when running on identical hardware, Sentinel without blacklisting and a standard nginx web
server have similar performance under a flood of HTTP requests. In this experiment, the
Sentinel software checks for and verifies hardware-authenticated Kerberos credentials, while
nginx does not. Using hardware-accelerated blacklisting provides Sentinel with significant
performance boost, as shown in Section 6.7. It is harder to implement hardware-accelerated
blacklisting on the web server platform because this requires adding the network acceleration
card to the server’s hardware configuration and developing a different version of the web
server application to communicate with the network via the acceleration card APIs instead
of standard network sockets. Therefore, because the Sentinel without blacklisting and the
nginx web server have identical performance on the same hardware and because it is easier to
implement hardware-accelerated blacklisting on a dedicated platform than on the web server
host, it is more beneficial to use Sentinel front-end devices than to add more web servers to
the web server farm to perform Sentinel’s responsibilities. This analysis assumes that the
nginx web server performance under an HTTP flood is representative for the performance of
other popular web servers. It is possible to implement the Sentinel functionality on the web
servers, but that would also require very disruptive hardware and software modifications.
As described in Section 5.2, a client KDC traverses the Kerberos authentication path,
obtains a service ticket from Sentinel’s KDC for accessing the web server, and passes it back
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to the client. The client then encodes the ticket into extensions to the HTTP and TLS
protocols. To avoid extending HTTP and TLS, Sentinel’s KDC could notify Sentinel, or a
firewall, that the client has been authenticated. Sentinel can maintain a whitelist of clients
currently authorized to access the web server and rate limit or discard traffic from other
clients during a DDoS attack. The drawback of this approach is that whitelisted clients can
only be identified by their IP addresses. This is a security problem because clients behind
middleboxes that translate between public and private IP addresses, such as routers and
web proxies, can share a public IP address with bots. Identifying legitimate clients based
on authentication tokens is more robust, but requires web clients to store tokens and send
them to the server inside a new type of HTTP cookies or a TLS extension. Both extensions
are acceptable because HTTP and TLS are designed to be extensible. HTTP cookies are
generated by servers and opaque to clients. There have been numerous extensions to TLS [46]
and the TLS specification requires endpoints to ignore extensions that they do not support.
The system described in this dissertation uses RSA SecurID hardware token authenti-
cation to verify that a web request was generated by a human user. Passwords and X.509
client certificates are alternative ways for the client to authenticate with their authentication
provider. However, passwords client certificates do not verify the human nature of web users
and could be stolen by bots and used to send malicious requests to the web server. Sentinel
uses hardware token authentication in a federated authentication environment to reduce the
number of tokens a user must have to one or a few. There are cheaper hardware token alter-
natives to RSA SecurIDs that have similar features. An example is the Vasco Digipass [7],
which Ebay and PayPal offer to their customers for two-factor authentication.
8.8 CONCLUSION
This chapter discussed related work and alternative approaches to solving the problem of
mitigating botnet-based DDoS attacks against web servers. In this section, I summarize how
Sentinel differs from the approaches described. Hardware token authentication can distin-
guish more effectively distinguish between human user and bots compared to CAPTCHA
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puzzles, JavaScript code snippets, passwords and certificate-based authentication. It can
be verified more easily than TPM-based attestation, which requires the verifier to maintain
lists of trusted and untrusted applications, and compare the client software against them.
The system proposed in this dissertation does not require changes to network infrastructure
besides deploying the transparent Sentinel front-end device. However, our system assumes
the existence of a Kerberos federated authentication environment. In comparison, deploying
WebSOS or roaming honeypots requires changes to the wide area network between the clients
and servers. Clients in the Sentinel architecture do not perform additional computation and
their requests do not see the extra latency incurred by client puzzles.
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9.0 CONCLUSION
This chapter concludes this dissertation. Section 9.1 summarizes the dissertation contribu-
tions and argues how they satisfy the initial thesis statement. Section 9.2 discusses future
work.
9.1 THESIS STATEMENT AND CONTRIBUTIONS
This dissertation provides evidence satisfying the following thesis statement:
I claim that federated client authentication using hardware tokens can
effectively protect HTTP and HTTPS servers against botnet-based DDoS attacks,
and that hardware-accelerated server front-ends can transparently and scalably
facilitate such authentication.
Hardware token authentication (Section 4.1) can be effectively used to distinguish be-
tween human users and bots. Unlike CAPTCHA puzzles, which hired human workers can
solve in arbitrarily large numbers, it is infeasible to obtain sufficiently many RSA SecurID
token codes because they become available at fixed intervals of one minute.
Hardware token authentication is impractical for the Web unless used in a federated
authentication setting because a user must possess a token for every web server that requires
one. In Sections 4.2 and 5.1, I integrate SecurID authentication with the Kerberos V5 pro-
tocol to reduce the number of hardware tokens a user must possess. Kerberos is resilient
to both man-in-the-middle and DDoS attacks, but is not well-suited for light-weight clients
authenticating with arbitrary web servers. Kerberos places the majority of the authenti-
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cation burden on the client, requires substantial client authentication, and prevents clients
from anonymously browsing the Web. Section 4.2.2 describes a novel offloaded Kerberos
authentication mechanism to push the authentication burden from the client to the client’s
KDC and reduce the required client configuration. Section 4.2.4 describes the application
of anonymous Kerberos proxy tickets to allow web users to prove their humaneness to web
servers without revealing their Kerberos identities.
Section 5.3 describes mechanisms to efficiently encode and verify hardware-authenticated
Kerberos credentials in HTTP and HTTPS requests. Chapter 3 and Section 4.3 present
the design and implementation of Sentinel, a hardware-accelerated server front-end device
that verifies Kerberos credentials. Sentinel is transparent to both clients and servers, and
does not require web server modification or re-configuration. It performs packet scrubbing,
stateful packet filtering, TCP connection splicing and deep packet inspection to robustly
check HTTP and HTTPS requests for authentication credentials. Sentinel blacklists clients
with excessive numbers of unauthenticated requests as bots and uses a network acceleration
card to efficiently discard bot-originated traffic in hardware.
The performance analysis in Sections 6.3 and 6.7 shows that Sentinel using blacklisting is
more resilient to HTTP request floods than a standard web server. Sentinel with hardware-
accelerated blacklisting can mitigate attacks of at least 24,000 HTTP requests/second. The
network acceleration card that implements blacklisting is commercially specified to handle
up to 1Gbps of attack traffic, or more than 100,000 HTTP requests/second, without affecting
non-blacklisted legitimate client traffic. A standard nginx web server with the same hardware
configuration can handle floods of only up to 19,000 HTTP requests/second. Sentinel without
blacklisting has identical performance to the nginx web server under HTTP request floods.
Sentinel offers significant performance benefits when mitigating floods of HTTPS re-
quests. Section 6.8 shows that an attacker can deplete the nginx web server CPU capacity
with floods of just 130 requests/second by forcing the server to execute two private key
cryptographic operations per HTTPS request. Verifying authentication credentials in Client
Hello extensions prevents Sentinel from executing private key operations and allows it to
mitigate attacks of up to 36,000 HTTPS requests/second, or an improvement of 275 times
over the nginx web server.
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For hardware token authentication on the Web to be effective, web browsers need an
intuitive user interface, where users can enter their Kerberos and hardware token authenti-
cation credentials. Sections 4.4 and 5.4 present the integration of Kerberos and hardware
token authentication into the Identiy Metasystem (IdM) framework and information cards.
Section 5.5 describes the interface presented to the user before and during hardware token
authentication.
This dissertation satisfies the claims presented in the thesis statement. It shows that
hardware token authentication integrated with Kerberos federated authentication can be
used to effectively distinguish between human users and bots. It presents mechanisms to
efficiently encode and verify hardware-authenticated Kerberos credentials in HTTP and
HTTPS requests. This dissertation also describes the design and implementation of Sen-
tinel, a hardware-accelerated, front-end device that efficiently verifies Kerberos credentials
and mitigates HTTP and HTTPS flood attacks against web servers.
9.2 FUTURE WORK
This section discusses three possible areas of future work for this dissertation: enabling
legitimate automated processes to access web servers under a DDoS attack, researching al-
ternatives to hardware tokens as forms of authentication, and designing cross-realm Kerberos
routing algorithms for authentication path discovery.
9.2.1 LEGITIMATE AUTOMATED PROCESS ACCESS TO WEB SERVERS
UNDER DDOS ATTACKS
The system architecture described in this dissertation allows human users to pre-authenticate
with a hardware token in order to access a Sentinel-protected web server under a DDoS
attack. However, not all legitimate HTTP and HTTPS requests are initiated by human users
using a web browser. The approach taken in this dissertation can be generalized and modified
to allow legitimate automated processes to access a web server under a DDoS attack. These
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automated processes may be started by a human user, or by another automated process. For
example, the former process may be a stock quote aggregator started on-demand by a broker
who needs to automate the analysis of up-to-date stock quote information. The latter may
be a travel portal that periodically pulls airline and hotel reservation data from different
web sites and displays the information to the portal’s customers. Both applications are
time-sensitive and the unavailability of the respective online resources can cause significant
losses of revenue. Both tasks are also too complex for a human user to perform from a web
browser.
9.2.2 ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF HUMAN USER VERIFICATION
The work in this dissertation can also be expanded by researching alternatives to hardware
tokens for authentication. In some cases, hardware tokens can be replaced by software
tokens – software applications running on desktop computers or mobile devices that mimic
the functionality of hardware tokens. Software tokens are easier to obtain and manage, but
they are also more vulnerable to reverse engineering. Attackers have greater opportunity
to reverse engineer software tokens and clone them to obtain arbitrary numbers of software
tokens. Software tokens codes are also more easily read by automated bots.
9.2.3 KERBEROS CROSS-REALM ROUTING PROTOCOLS FOR AUTHEN-
TICATION PATH DISCOVERY
This dissertation proposes offloaded Kerberos authentication, which transfers the majority of
the authentication burden from a web client to its Kerberos KDC. The client’s KDC traverses
the cross-realm Kerberos authentication path and obtains a service ticket for the desired web
server from the name of the client. The client’s KDC can use server name canonicalization
with the web server’s DNS name to discover the identity and address of the server’s Kerberos
KDC. However, the client’s KDC must be able to discover the authentication path between
itself and the server’s KDC in order to traverse the path and obtain the desired service
ticket. A possible extension to this dissertation is to propose cross-realm routing protocols
that allow KDCs to discover authentication paths to other KDCs.
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